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ABSTRACT: In 1969, Shoup postulated that the presence of interrelated taxes in a tax system 
would reinforce the tax penalty system ("self-reinforcing penalty system of taxes"). In this 
paper, we have tried to formally develop this idea. We find that in order for tax reinforcement to 
be maintained, it is necessary for interrelated taxes to be administered by a single tax 
administration, or if they are administered by different tax administrations, the level of 
collaboration between them has to be sufficiently high. If so, tax evasion in interrelated taxes 
might be considered as an alternative explanation for the gap between the levels of tax evasion 
that can be guessed in practice and the much higher levels predicted by the classical tax evasion 
theory (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974). Otherwise, the result anticipated by 
Shoup may even be reversed. Moreover, as long as collaboration is imperfect, the classical 
results of the comparative statics might change, since in some cases, although global tax 
compliance increases when faced with a variation in a tax parameter, it can decrease in a single 
tax. 
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RESUMEN: En 1969, Shoup postuló que la presencia de impuestos interrelacionados en un 
sistema fiscal reforzaría el sistema sancionador y, por tanto, el cumplimiento fiscal ("self-
reinforcing penalty system of taxes"). En este estudio, se ha tratado de desarrollar formalmente 
esta idea. Así, se ha obtenido que para que se produzca ese incremento previsto del 
cumplimiento fiscal, es necesario que los impuestos interrelacionados estén administrados por 
una única administración o, en todo caso, si son administrados por diferentes administraciones, 
el nivel de colaboración entre ellas debe ser suficientemente elevado. Si es así, la consideración 
de la evasión fiscal en impuestos interrelacionados puede ser considerada como una explicación 
alternativa de la brecha existente entre los niveles de evasión fiscal que se intuyen en la práctica 
y aquellos otros mucho más elevados que predice la teoría clásica de la evasión fiscal 
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974). En otro caso, el resultado anticipado por Shoup 
puede no darse y ser exactamente el contrario. Además, en la medida en que la colaboración sea 
imperfecta, los resultados clásicos de la estática comparativa pueden cambiar, dado que en 
algunas circunstancias, aunque el cumplimiento fiscal global aumente ante la variación en un 
parámetro fiscal, puede disminuir en un impuesto concreto. 
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1. Introduction 
Kaldor (1956) argued that in a tax system in which a capital gains tax, a personal 
income tax, an expenditure tax, a wealth tax and an inheritance and donations tax were 
present, with a single tax return audited, the extent of tax evasion could be checked 
comprehensively. This is the so-called “self-checking system of taxes”. His argument is 
based on the obvious relationships between the tax bases of all five taxes. The sum of 
the amount of tax base declared in expenditure tax and in capital gains tax should 
therefore be congruent with the tax base declared in personal income tax. If it does not 
match, this might be because the taxpayer has either consumed part of her initial stock 
of wealth (or she has made a donation), or because some of the tax bases have been 
under-declared. In the first case, this should be compatible with a decrease in the tax 
base of the wealth tax (or with an increase in the tax base of the recipient’s donations 
tax) once capital gains have also been taken into account, while in the second case, it 
should be an useful hint for starting a tax auditing process. 
This certainly seems a powerful system to ease the tasks of the tax auditors. However, 
note that congruity between tax bases does not necessarily imply no tax evasion. That is 
why Shoup (1969) suggested renaming the tax system proposed by Kaldor as a “self-
reinforcing penalty system of taxes”. This means that when taxpayers face the decision 
about how much tax base to evade, they should bear in mind that as long as tax bases 
are crosschecked, their decision might not only have consequences on that tax, but also 
on other interrelated taxes. Having increased the expected cost of tax evasion, such type 
of tax systems should therefore be useful a priori in promoting tax compliance. In our 
paper, we will try to confirm that supposition by means of formally developing the 
original ideas of Kaldor (1956) and Shoup (1969), and we will do so by focusing our 
analysis on the interrelation between a wealth tax and a personal income tax. However, 
this analysis cannot only be applied to personal taxes, neither only in a static setting. 
For example, Das-Gupta and Gang (2001) recently developed a similar model of tax 
evasion applied to Value Added Tax (VAT) (see also the analysis of interrelated tax 
evasion in the VAT by Fedeli and Forte, 1999). The reason for analysing VAT arises 
from the tax administration’s ability to match sales invoices with purchase invoices. 
These authors find that although crosschecking might distort purchase and sale 
decisions, a sufficiently high level of crosschecking can encourage truthful reporting. 
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To a certain extent, Engel and Hines (1999) also applied Shoup’s (1969) idea in a 
dynamic setting (in fact, the seminal work by Allingham and Sandmo, 1972, section 5, 
also considered tax evasion within a dynamic setting). In their work, these authors find 
that for rational taxpayers, current evasion is a decreasing function of prior evasion, 
since, if audited for tax evasion in the current year, they may incur penalties for past 
evasions as well. Within this framework, they estimate that tax evasion is 42% lower 
than it would be if taxpayers were not concerned about retrospective audits. These 
results are certainly very interesting, and make the need for expansion of the classical 
analysis of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974) clear, taking 
into account the interrelation between tax bases, and therefore the possibility of 
crosschecking by the tax administration. 
In our paper, when incongruity between tax returns is detected by the tax 
administration, the tax audit probability tends to increase above its “normal” level. This 
means that as long as both taxes are administered by a single tax administration, 
congruity is the optimal choice for the taxpayer. However, in some cases (typically, in 
federal systems) taxes are not always administered by the same layer of government. As 
long as collaboration between tax administrations is not perfect, it is therefore possible 
that crosschecking is not sufficient to induce congruity between tax returns. By 
imperfect collaboration, we refer to the situation in which when one tax administration 
is carrying out an audit, it does not put too much effort into detecting tax evasion on 
behalf of the other1. In fact, imperfect collaboration implies that the level of tax 
compliance might be even lower than that predicted by the classical analysis! In any 
case, as long as collaboration is perfect, or is not too low if imperfect, tax evasion in 
interrelated taxes might be considered as a partial explanation for the paradox of tax 
evasion. The paradox of tax evasion comes about when the observed (or guessed) levels 
of tax compliance and those predicted by the classical analysis are compared. In order to 
                                                           
1 Niepelt (2002) analysed tax evasion in a dynamic setting, and like us, considered the 
possibility that tax evasion is not fully discovered during an audit. However, he justified this 
assumption without referring to a lack of collaboration between tax administrations, but simply 
as a handicap of a tax administration. In any event, in his words, it leads to an “uncorrelated 
detection risk”, which calls for analysing tax evasion focusing on the many sources of 
taxpayer’s tax base, instead of on the taxpayer. This conclusion very much resembles our 
differential analysis, depending on whether congruity or incongruity is optimal from the 
taxpayer’s point of view. In the former, the unit of analysis will be the taxpayer, since 
differences in the level of tax compliance between tax bases do not arise, while in the latter, the 
unit of analysis is each tax base, since tax compliance is not homogenous across taxes.  
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achieve the observed levels of tax compliance from the classical analysis, the degree of 
risk-aversion and/or the level of the tax enforcement parameters have to be abnormally 
high. In order to overcome this paradox, the literature has proposed the existence of 
both economic and non-economic factors (e.g., see the clear and detailed review of this 
literature by Alm, 1999). In general, the conclusion of the literature is that the original 
model of gambling applied to tax evasion might be too simple to take into account the 
numerous factors that affect the reporting decisions of individuals. In this regard, 
interrelated tax evasion might be considered as another factor to be taken into account, 
and as we will show in numerical simulations, on some occasions this factor alone can 
solve the paradox of tax evasion. 
In the context of interrelated tax evasion, we have also performed a comparative static 
analysis. In the classical analysis, a reinforcement of any tax parameter tends to promote 
tax compliance (see the review by Andreoni et al., 1998)2. In our analysis, as long as 
collaboration between tax administrations is perfect, those results remain unchanged. 
Nonetheless, when collaboration is imperfect, the results might change. Due to the 
ambiguity of the theoretical analysis in this latter situation, we have had to make use of 
the methodology of numerical simulations. All the results of numerical simulation 
confirm those obtained by the classical analysis with respect to overall tax compliance, 
or at least when tax compliance in each tax is weighted by the importance of their 
respective tax burdens. However, this result no longer holds when tax compliance is 
analysed tax by tax (see fn. 1). This result is extremely important once we take into 
account that the policy decisions of one tax administration (i.e., level of government) 
will have consequences not only for its tax base, but also for the tax base of the other 
tax administration (level of government). A tax externality stemming from the tasks of 
tax administration therefore arises as long as different layers of government are 
responsible for each tax. Cremer and Gahvari (2000) considered the audit rate as an 
additional strategic tax parameter between sub-national governments within a federal 
system, while Baccheta and Espinosa (1995) analysed the incentives for sharing 
information between national governments in an open economy, although they did not 
                                                           
2 However, some authors have recently shown that the signs of the comparative statics can 
reverse by slightly modifying the original framework of the classical analysis. For instance, 
Boadway et al. (2002) or Borck (2002) have demonstrated that in certain circumstances an 
increase in the penalty per unit of tax evaded can decrease tax compliance; while Lee (2001) has 
shown the same, but for the case of an increase in the marginal tax rate. 
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include the possibility of tax evasion in their model. The identification of a potential tax 
externality in the context of tax administration is thus not totally new. Nevertheless, this 
confirms Andreoni et al. (1998)’s statement in the sense that how to integrate tax 
enforcement across different levels of government may be one of the tax compliance 
issues that merits further research (p. 835). In any event, this line of research is not dealt 
with in this paper. 
In the following section, we formulate the theoretical model and our assumptions, 
especially those referring to the tax audit probability in the presence of interrelated tax 
evasion. The taxpayer’s decision over tax evasion is characterized, and a comparative 
static analysis is performed. This analysis crucially depends on the degree of 
collaboration between the tax administrations responsible for each tax. In section 3, we 
carry out a numerical simulation exercise, which enables us to complement the results 
of the theoretical model. Thus, given a simple parameterisation, we can ascertain to 
what extent interrelated tax evasion can solve the paradox of tax evasion; in which 
circumstances it is more likely that the tax bases declared in each tax return are 
incongruent; and finally, we can examine some of the ambiguities detected in the 
analytical comparative statics. We conclude in section 4.  
 
2. Theoretical Model 
In this section, we will first establish how the presence of interrelated taxes changes tax 
enforcement parameters, and in particular, tax audit probability. Obviously, this is the 
key to all the theoretical analysis carried out in the paper. We will then analyse the 
behavior of the taxpayer in this context of interrelated tax evasion, including a 
comparative statics analysis. This analysis will be carried out in the presence of both 
perfect and imperfect collaboration between tax administrations. 
Assumptions about the tax audit probability 
We assume that the tax administration obtains valuable information from crosschecking 
the taxpayers’ tax returns. In particular, the tax administration considers the following 
budget constraint for each taxpayer: 
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SYSCY +=+= β  [1] 
where Y is income obtained by a taxpayer during the fiscal year, which can be either 
consumed, C, or saved, S (i.e., S is the increase in the stock of wealth obtained during 
that fiscal year3), and β  is the marginal propensity to consume. Income is taxed by 
personal income tax, while savings are taxed by wealth tax. Given the level of income 
declared in the personal income tax, DY , the level of wealth declared in the wealth tax, 
DS , and supposing a certain marginal propensity to consume, β 4, the tax administration 
can infer whether the relationship given by expression [1] holds, i.e. 
DDDD SYS'CY +=+>
≤ β  [2] 
where 'C  is the level of taxpayer’s consumption inferred by the tax administration, and 
YYD ≤  and SSD ≤ . As long as expression [2] holds with equality, the tax administration 
will not notice any incongruity between the tax bases declared in each tax return, and 
will not increase the tax audit probability above the "normal" level, that is, when there is 
no incongruity5. Otherwise, an incongruity will be an "alarm bell" for the tax 
                                                           
3 The budget constraint [1] could have been expressed within an inter-temporal framework, 
although for simplification we have left aside such possibility. For instance, Y could have been 
considered as the personal income obtained during a certain period of time, which has made the 
accumulation of a certain stock of wealth, S, and a certain level of inter-temporal consumption, 
C, possible. Otherwise, given that the tax base of the wealth tax is the stock of wealth and not 
the increase in wealth, for our analytical purposes, expression [1] has to be considered in such a 
way that at the beginning of the fiscal year (i.e., at the beginning of the only period of our static 
analysis), the taxpayer’s stock of wealth is nil. As a consequence, there is no difference between 
stock of wealth and increase in the stock of wealth in our theoretical analysis, but that will be 
properly taken into account in the numerical simulations of section 3. 
 
4 From now on, we will suppose that the marginal propensity to consume adopted by the tax 
administration (see expression [2] next) and the real one coincide. As we will see, this 
assumption will make the interpretation of the results of comparative statics easier. 
 
5 Expression [2] could be modified in order to incorporate a margin of error, 0>ε , i.e., 
εβ ++
>
≤
DDD SYY . For example, suppose that according to the personal income tax return YD= 
100. Assuming 80,=β , the stock of wealth declared in the wealth tax should then be 20, but in 
fact, considering a certain margin of error of ±10%, SD should be between 18 and 22. Otherwise, 
if SD were above (below) 22 (18), the probability of auditing personal income tax (wealth tax) 
would increase above its "normal" level. However, the results of our marginal analysis are 
independent of the inclusion of a margin of error. 
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administration to audit the taxpayer’s tax returns6. Put in graphic terms, 
FIGURE 1: Auditing probabilities in each tax 
 
 
 
 
On the left hand side, the graph shows the tax audit probability in personal income tax, 
pY. As long as CSY DD +≥ , the tax audit probability remains at its "normal" level, 
Yp . 
Otherwise, the audit probability is increasing in the value of the incongruity, 
0>−+ DD YCS . Similarly, the graph on the right hand side shows the tax audit 
probability in wealth tax, pS. In fact, by summing both functions of probability of tax 
auditing, we obtain the following function: 
 
 
                                                           
6 For instance, in Spain during the summer of 2002, the National Tax Administration (the 
Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria, AEAT), which is responsible for the auditing 
of personal income tax (while the responsibility for auditing wealth tax is shared with the 
regional governments), extensively crosschecked personal income tax and wealth tax returns. 
According to the Director of the AEAT, the reason for this massive crosschecking was that the 
price of new houses and luxury cars purchased (in our terms, an increase in the monetary value 
of the stock of wealth) did not match the income declared by taxpayers in personal income tax. 
See the information given by the newspaper La Vanguardia, 10/3/2002. 
 
      pY 
    pY 
   Yp  
    SD+C YD 
           pS 
      pS 
   YD-C SD 
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FIGURE 2: Total tax auditing probability 
 
 
where we have assumed that SY pp = . Keeping SD unchanged, for values of YD below 
(above) SD+C an increase in YD therefore decreases (increases) the probability of being 
audited in personal income tax (wealth tax), and so pY + pS.  
In our model the tax audit probability is thus endogenous, since it depends on the level 
of tax bases declared, SD and YD. In the next section, we will try to identify those 
situations in which the taxpayer might find it optimal to deviate from the strategy that 
involves the minimisation of the probability of being audited, SY pp + , i.e. being 
congruent ( DD YCS =+ ). 
Definition: the tax audit probability, p, is a function YSDD pp)Y,S(p += , such that for 
DD YCS >+ , 0>∂∂ DY Sp  and 0<∂∂ DY Yp , while Sp is a constant; for DD YCS <+ , 
0<∂∂ DS Sp  and 0>∂∂ DS Yp , with Yp  being a constant; finally, for DD YCS =+ , p is 
a parameter, i.e., it is independent of the amount of tax bases declared. 
... When collaboration between tax administrations is perfect. 
In this section, we will analyse a situation in which either both tax returns (personal 
income tax and wealth tax) are administered by a single tax administration or they are 
 pY, pS 
 pY +pS 
       SD+C                                                 YD 
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administered by two different tax administrations (i.e., each is a part of a different layer 
of government) but collaboration between them is perfect. An example of perfect 
collaboration is a situation in which when wealth tax return is audited, not only is tax 
evasion in wealth tax fully discovered, but also evasion in personal income tax. To the 
extent that there exists only one tax administration, it is perfectly understandable that 
tax evasion in both taxes will be fully discovered independently of which tax return is 
audited, since the total amount of tax revenue collected will remain in hands of that 
single tax administration. However, when there are two independent tax 
administrations, the situation is different: perfect collaboration implies that the tax 
administration that is carrying out an audit (e.g., in wealth tax) will make an additional 
effort to discover tax fraud (e.g., in personal income tax) that will only benefit the other 
tax administration. In any case, we will suppose for now that even in the case that there 
were two (institutionally independent) tax administrations, each one of them would have 
an incentive to fully discover evasion of both taxes.     
Characterization of the Taxpayer’s Behaviour 
According to the classical analysis by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the taxpayer 
attempts to minimise the amount of taxes paid. However, such a decision is not without 
risk, since this tax fraud might be detected by the tax administration, depending on the 
tax auditing probability. If taxpayers are audited, they will then be fined in proportion to 
the amount of taxes evaded. We assume that the taxpayer is risk-averse, 
')'Y(U)'Y(U >> 0 , where U(Y) is the utility that the taxpayer derives from income7, 
and Y is an exogenous variable in our model8. Analytically, the objective function of the 
taxpayer, W, is as follows: 
[ ]
[ ]DPDRSY
DPDRDPDR
SY
StYtYU)pp(                   
)SS(Ft)YY(FtStYtYU)pp(W
−−−−+
+−−−−−−+≡
1
 [3] 
The first summand in square brackets (hereafter denoted by A) is income at the 
taxpayer’s disposal net of paying taxes after auditing. In that case, taxpayer pay taxes on 
                                                           
7 Partial derivatives of functions of only one variable will be denoted by a prime, while for 
functions of more than one variable, a subscript will indicate the variable of the corresponding 
partial derivative. 
 
8 See Pencavel (1979), for a model of tax evasion in which Y (labor supply) is considered as an 
endogenous variable; and other references cited in Andreoni et al. (1998), p. 824. 
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personal income tax according to the (marginal) tax rate tR ( 10 ≤≤ Rt ), but as long as 
they have evaded taxes ( DYY > ), they will also have to pay F per each unit of tax 
evaded in personal income tax, tR(Y-YD), where 1≥F . The same reasoning applies to 
the case of wealth tax, where the marginal tax rate in that case is Pt  ( 10 ≤≤ Pt ). The 
second summand in square brackets (from now on, denoted by B) is income at the 
taxpayer’s disposal when none of the tax returns are audited. Given the presence of 
perfect collaboration between tax administrations, only these two states can occur: A or 
B. The probability of occurrence of the first is YS pp + , i.e. it occurs when either of the 
two tax administrations audits9, while state B occurs when neither of them audits, with 
YS pp −−1  being the probability of occurrence of that state.  
As we have said previously, the objective of the taxpayer is to minimise the amount of 
taxes paid, i.e. given the existence of taxes, taxpayers aims to maximise net income10. 
They will therefore choose YD and SD such that expression [3] is maximised. 
Nevertheless, we know that as long as they are incongruent with respect to the amount 
of tax bases declared ( DD S'CY >
≤
+ ), the tax audit probabilities of expression [3] are 
endogenous. Before solving the maximisation problem of the taxpayer, we therefore 
need to know whether (in)congruity could be an optimal strategy for them.  
Is it optimal to be congruent in the tax bases declared? 
We are assuming that regardless of which tax return is originally audited, both tax 
evasion in personal income tax and in wealth tax are fully discovered by the tax 
administration. Moreover, we suppose that both functions of tax auditing are symmetric, 
i.e., SYSSYYYS DDDD pppp === , and 
SY pp = . From now on, unless necessary, we will 
therefore not distinguish between Yp and Sp , and will simply refer to p, which is Yp + 
Sp . Under these assumptions, we wonder whether under certain circumstances it will 
                                                           
9 Although it does not modify the results of the present analysis, the possibility that both tax 
administrations simultaneously carry out a tax audit can be reasonably ruled out, i.e., pY×pS=0., 
These two events can therefore be considered as mutually exclusive.  
 
10 This characterization of a rational taxpayer is consistent with the following description given 
by Cowell (1990): "(he) is "predisposed to dishonesty" because the taxpayer does not put 
responsibility to the State before his own interests" (p. 50). 
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be optimal for the taxpayer to be incongruous.  
For instance, we wonder whether it could be optimal that DD Y'CS >+ . In that case, and 
keeping DY constant, the following conditions should hold: 
[ ] [ ] 011 1111111 >−−−+−=∂
∂
<+
)'B(U)p()'A(U)F(pt)B(U)A(Up
S
W
PS
Y'CSD
D
DD
 [4] 
where the index 1 is necessary since the (marginal) utility of income is obviously not 
the same for all levels of SD and YD, and the tax audit probability might also vary 
according to those two variables. Hence, in expression [4], the index 1 is referring to a 
situation under which DD Y'CS <+ . The next condition – which implies that SD+C’=YD 
is not an optimal strategy for the taxpayer - should also hold 
011 2222 >−−−=∂
∂
=+
)'B(U)p()'A(U)F(p
S
W
DD Y'CSD
 [5] 
where 01 <
DS
p , 21 pp > , )B(U)A(U ii <  and )'B(U)'A(U ii >  ∀ i; while at the 
(supposed) optimum, 
[ ] [ ] 011 3333333 =−−−+−=∂
∂
>+
)'B(U)p()'A(U)F(pt)B(U)A(Up
S
W
PS
Y'CSD
D
DD
 [6] 
where 03 >
DSp , 23 pp > , and 13 pp >
≤
. 
Additionally, in order to guarantee an interior solution (S>SD), we need the following 
condition to hold: 
0<
∂
∂
=SSD D
S
W  [7] 
The next Lemma states the non-optimality of incongruity from a rational taxpayer’s 
point of view. 
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Lemma: As long as 0>
DSp  and 0>DYp , it will always be optimal for the taxpayer to 
be congruous. Otherwise, the optimal strategy for the taxpayer is indeterminate.   
Proof: the reasoning is as follows. Expression [6] must hold both for DS and DY , i.e. at 
the optimum, 
[ ] [ ] 011 3333333 =−−−+−=∂
∂
>+
)'B(U)p()'A(U)F(pt)B(U)A(Up
Y
W
RY
Y'CSD
D
DD
 [8] 
Given that 03 <
DYp  and )B(U)A(U 33 < , in order for expression [8] to hold, it is 
therefore necessary that 011 3333 <−−− )'B(U)p()'A(U)F(p . However, according to 
expression [6], and given that 03 >
DSp , 011 3333 >−−− )'B(U)p()'A(U)F(p . Therefore, 
expressions [6] and [8] cannot hold simultaneously, and incongruity cannot be an 
optimum. Given that the same reasoning is applicable for the case in which DD Y'CS <+ , 
congruity is the only possible solution as long as 0>
DSp  and 0>DYp . In the case that 
the probability of auditing is independent of incongruity, i.e. 0=
DSp  and 0=DYp , the 
solution to the maximisation of expression [3] is indeterminate, with congruity being 
one of the many solutions   
We have shown that incongruity can never be an optimal strategy for a rational taxpayer 
in the event that the tax audit probability is determined by incongruity between tax 
returns, and by collaboration between tax administrations being perfect. The reason for 
this is that in order for DD Y'CS >+ to be optimal, for example, the taxpayer’s welfare 
reduction due to a higher probability of tax auditing compared to its "normal" level, 
YY pp > , must be exceeded by the net expected gains of increasing tax compliance in 
wealth tax keeping the tax audit probability constant. Nevertheless, given that the sign 
of the latter expected gains is independent of the (marginal) tax rate, there would still be 
gains by increasing DY . Moreover, in that case, increasing DY  would also lead to a 
decrease in the tax auditing probability (through a reduction in pY). The strategy under 
which DD Y'CS >+  can thus never be optimal, since in that situation it would always be 
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welfare-enhancing to increase DY
11. From the taxpayer’s point of view, this means that 
both tax bases are perfect substitutes, and so they simply aim to minimise the tax 
auditing probability, p. 
Optimal level of declared tax base  
We have previously described the taxpayer as a rational individual predisposed to 
dishonesty (see also fn. 10), i.e. an individual who aims at maximising his or her own 
welfare by means of deciding how much tax base to declare independently of the 
consequences of this decision on the rest of society12. The social consequences of these 
actions are basically the loss of tax revenues for the government (and thus public 
welfare provision) due to erosion of the tax base. Analytically, the taxpayer solves the 
following maximisation problem: 
'CSYs.t.Y,S
WMax
DDDD +=          
          
 
Once DY has been substituted into W (which has been previously defined by means of 
expression [3]), the only decision variable of the taxpayer is therefore DS . This is the 
decision we will consider. The FOC of the maximisation problem with respect to DS  is 
thus the following: 
)'B(U)p()F()'A(pU −=− 11  [9] 
                                                           
11 To a certain extent, the result provided by the Lemma is similar to the one obtained under a 
“cut-off” rule (see Border and Sobel, 1987; Reinganum and Wilde, 1985; Sánchez and Sobel, 
1993). Under such a rule, the tax administration establishes a threshold below which all 
taxpayers are audited, while above it all taxpayers are unaudited. Assuming that taxpayers are 
risk-neutral and that the tax administration can commit itself to such an audit rule, all those 
taxpayers with a tax base above the threshold declare only the amount fixed by the threshold. In 
our case, the threshold is endogenous. From the point of view of the tax administration 
responsible for the personal income tax, for instance, the relevant threshold is SD+C’, with SD 
being endogenous from the point of view of the taxpayer. In our model, despite the assumption 
of risk-aversion, the taxpayer thus finds it optimal to declare only the amount set by the 
threshold, or in our terms, finds it optimal to be congruent.  
 
12 See, e.g., Bordignon (1993) for a model that takes moral issues into account when describing 
the taxpayer's behaviour; or Cowell and Gordon (1988), and Alm et al. (1992), who consider the 
taxpayer's evaluation of the activity of the public sector; see also the references cited by 
Andreoni et al. (1998), section 8; and the complete review by Alm (1999), already cited in the 
introduction. 
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i.e. at the optimum, the marginal cost of evading taxes (the left-hand side of expression 
[9]) equals the marginal benefit of evading taxes (the right-hand side of expression [9]). 
Finally, in order to guarantee that full tax compliance (S=SD) is not an optimal strategy 
for the taxpayer, and using expression [7], we obtain the classical condition that 1<pF  
(see Yitzhaki, 1974, expression [6']*)13. From now on, we will assume that such 
condition holds, and so at the optimum DSS > . 
Comparative statics 
As we have shown above, in the case of perfect collaboration between tax 
administrations, congruity is the only optimal strategy. In order to perform an exercise 
of comparative statics, we will therefore only analyse the way in which reported wealth, 
SD, depends on the parameters of the model p,t,t,F RP , since congruity implies that YD 
can be directly obtained from )/(SY DD β−= 1 .  
In order to obtain dFdS D , we first totally differentiate expression [9], Φ ,   
[ ]
[ ]           dS)B(R)'B(U)p()F)(A(R)'A(pU)t't(-              
dF)F))(SS(t)YY(t)(A(R)'A(pU)'A(pU)t't(d
DPR
DPDRPR
−+−+
−−−+−++==
11
10
22
Φ
 [10] 
in which we have employed the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, 
( ) 0≥−= )A('U)A(''U)A(R , and the same for state B. In expression [10], tR’=tR/(1-
β)14. Operating on expression [10], we then have 
[ ] 011
111
2 ≥
−+−+
+−−−+
=
)B(R)'B(U)p()F)(A(R)'A(pU)t't(
))t't)()(YY)(F)(A(R()'A(pU
dF
dS
PR
PRDD β  [11] 
An increase in the penalty per unit of tax evaded thus reduces the level of tax evasion in 
                                                           
13 Although in this case, remember that p=pY+pS. 
 
14 This alternative definition of tR arises from expression [2] when it holds with equality, YD(1-
β)=SD. An increase in SD (and consequently in YD by 1/(1-β)) therefore makes the marginal tax 
rate of the personal income tax borne by the taxpayer tR/(1-β), and not only tR, such that tR’>tR. 
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wealth tax, and given congruity, also in personal income tax15. The numerator of 
expression [11] can be disintegrated into an income effect and a substitution effect. On 
the one hand, this latter effect, pU(A)', includes the increase in the profitability of tax 
compliance due to the increase in the fine per unit of tax evaded; on the other hand, an 
income effect, pU(A)'R(A)(F-1)(Y-YD)(1-β)(tR’+tP), is also positive, since the increase in 
F reduces net income of the taxpayer both in state A and B, and given the assumption of 
decreasing risk-aversion, this tends to increase the valuation of the marginal cost of tax 
evasion more than the valuation of the marginal benefit, and thereby increases tax 
compliance. 
In the case of an increase in Pt , operating as above but also making use of the FOC 
(expression [9]), we obtain the following reaction: 
[ ]
[ ] 01 ≥+−+
−+−
=
)B(R)F)(A(R)t't(
)SS(F)A(R)B(R)A(RS
dt
dS
PR
DD
P
D  [12] 
since according to the usual assumption about decreasing absolute risk aversion, 
)B(R)A(R > ; while in the case of an increase in Rt , 
[ ]
[ ] 01 ≥+−+
−+−
=
)B(R)F)(A(R)t't(
)YY(F)A(R)B(R)A(RY
dt
dS
PR
DD
R
D  [13] 
Faced with an increase in any of the marginal tax rates, only an income effect is present, 
since a rise in the marginal tax rate simultaneously increases the penalty per unit of tax 
evaded, and thus the substitution effect vanishes (see Yitzhaki, 1974). Note that as long 
as wealth tax is assigned to one government and personal income tax to another, 
considering tax evasion in interrelated taxes permits the detection of a tax externality 
between governments. For instance, according to expression [13], an increase in the 
marginal tax rate of personal income tax will not only affect the amount of tax base 
declared in that tax (and so the amount of tax revenue collected), but also that declared 
in wealth tax. Finally, by comparing [12] and [13], it is easy to verify that 
                                                           
15 Note that, on the one hand, dYD/dF=(1/(1-β))(dSD/dF), so the total effect of increasing F on 
the amount of tax bases declared is dSD/dF(1+(1/(1-β))). On the other hand, in terms of 
elasticity, ε, there is no difference between the variation in SD and the variation in YD, i.e., 
F,YF,S DD
εε = . 
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PDRD dtdSdtdS > as long as β>0. 
Finally, faced with an increase in p, 
[ ] 011
 1
≥
+−−+
+−
=
)B(R)F)(A(R)'B(U)p)(t't(
)'B(U)F()'A(U
dp
dS
PR
D  [14] 
where only a substitution effect is at work. 
From the results of this section, we can conclude that when collaboration between tax 
administrations is perfect, the results of the comparative statics do not differ from the 
original results from Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974). However, as 
suggested above, it is important to note that as long as tax evasion in interrelated taxes 
is considered, the statutory tax parameters of either or both taxes (tR or tP) or those 
instruments set by a tax administration (F, pY or pS)16 simultaneously affect the 
taxpayer’s behaviour in both taxes, i.e. we have been able to identify a tax externality. 
From a social point of view, it therefore seems necessary that those parameters are 
decided taking into account their effects on both taxes, otherwise their level will not be 
optimal with respect to the situation in which the tax administration is fully integrated 
and the power to change the statutory tax parameters is in the hands of just one 
government. On the whole, to use the terminology of Shoup (1969), the interrelation 
between tax bases creates a “self-reinforcing penalty system of taxes”17. In the 
numerical simulations of Section 3, we will analyse these issues in more detail in the 
sense of checking how this system of taxes raises the level of tax compliance. 
... When collaboration between tax administrations is imperfect. 
If collaboration between tax administrations is imperfect, when the taxpayer is caught 
evading taxes only a share of the tax revenue due to the other tax administration is 
discovered. This might be understood as a low-powered incentive of the tax 
                                                           
16 It is true that the value of F is legally set by the political power. However, a tax inspector 
might vary its value discretionally depending on the development of the tax auditing process. In 
this regard, see OECD (1990) for a comparison between OECD countries of the divergence 
between the legal value of F and the real one set by tax auditors.  
 
17 Note that, as suggested in the introduction, this is quite different from a “self-checking system 
of taxes” (Kaldor, 1956), since it is not possible to be fully certain that the inferred level of 
wealth (income) is such that tax evasion is null from the level of income (wealth) declared.   
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administration that has audited to collect tax revenue on behalf of the other tax 
administration18.  
In the case of imperfect collaboration, net income at the disposal of the taxpayer when 
the tax administration responsible for the personal income tax audits is thus 
)SS(Ft)YY(FttStYYA DYPDRPDRD −−−−−−≡ α  [15] 
where Yα  is the percentage of tax evasion discovered in wealth tax, such that 
10 <≤ Yα . In the case of perfect collaboration between tax administrations, 1=Yα
19. 
Similarly, when the tax administration responsible for the wealth tax audits, net income 
is 
)SS(Ft)YY(FttStYYD DPDSRPDRD −−−−−−≡ α  [16] 
where again 10 <≤ Sα . Finally, when neither tax administration carries out a tax audit, 
net income is  
PDRD tStYYE −−≡  [17] 
For instance, from [16], as long as 1<Sα , it is thus not clear whether an increase in the 
amount of tax base declared in personal income tax, DY , increases the amount of net 
income at the taxpayer’s disposal, since 
011
≤
>
−+−= )F(t)F('tD PSRS D α  [18] 
                                                           
18 Obviously, if there exists only one tax administration, there might also exist internal 
inefficiencies within that tax administration. For instance, it could be the case that different 
departments within the same tax administration - each one of them in charge of a tax or of a 
group of taxes - might not fully cooperate between them. Then, it would not be necessary to 
consider the possibility that there were two imperfectly coordinated tax administrations in order 
that in some occasions the percentage of tax evasion discovered is less than 100%. In any case, 
although it is not relevant for our analysis, the non-cooperative possibility seems less likely 
within a tax administration than between two institutionally independent tax administrations.  
 
19 Given that the percentage of tax fraud discovered depends on the effort carried out by the tax 
administration (that is, the level of collaboration between tax administrations), Yα could also be 
interpreted as the effort of the tax administration in discovering tax evasion on behalf of the 
other tax administration. For 1=Yα , for example, that level of effort is thus maximum. 
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where it will be remembered that tR’=tR/(1-β) (see footnote 14). Only as long as 
[ ] 1>++> )t't()t't(F PSRPR α , will expression [18] be positive, as in the case in which 
collaboration is perfect and the tax administration responsible for the wealth tax is 
auditing. Unlike that situation, in order for marginal net income to increase as a 
consequence of having reduced the level of tax evasion, it is therefore no longer 
sufficient that 1>F if 1<Sα . Otherwise, as long as [ ])t't()t't(F PSRPR ++< α , 
although one of the two tax administrations were auditing, the taxpayer would still 
obtain marginal increases in net income by evading taxes20. As we will confirm, that 
possibility will partly make the results of the comparative statics ambiguous when 
collaboration between tax administrations is imperfect. However, before performing the 
exercise of comparative statics, we again previously need to know whether incongruity 
or merely congruity, as before, is an optimal strategy for the taxpayer.  
Is it optimal to be congruent in the declared tax bases? 
In the case of imperfect collaboration between tax administrations incongruity might be 
an optimal strategy for the taxpayer. In order to show such a result, let us analyse the 
possibility in which DD Y'CS <+ . The following FOC’s should thus hold: 
[ ] [ ] 0111 1111111111 >−−−−+−+−=∂
∂
>+
)'E(U)pp()'D(U)F(p)'A(U)F(pt)E(U)A(Up
Y
W SY
S
SY
RY
Y'CSD
D
DD
α
 [19] 
such that )E(U)A(U ii < , and )'E(U)'A(U ii > i∀ , and 01 <DYp ; but also 
[ ] 0111 2222222 >−−−−+−=∂
∂
=+
)'E(U)pp()F()'D(Up)F()'A(Upt
Y
W SY
S
SY
R
Y'CSD DD
α  [20] 
while at the (supposed) optimum, the following two conditions should hold: 
[ ] [ ] 0111 3333333333 =−−−−+−+−=∂
∂
<+
)'E(U)pp()'D(U)F(p)F()'A(Upt)E(U)D(Up
Y
W SY
S
SY
RY
Y'CSD
D
DD
α
 [21] 
                                                           
20 An alternative explanation for the negative sign of expression [18] is that the level of tR’ (with 
respect to tP) is relatively high, while the level of αS is low enough and in any case it is not 
compensated by a large value of F. 
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such that )D(U)E(U ii > , and )'E(U)'D(U ii > i∀ , and 03 >DYp ; and 
[ ] [ ] 0111 3333333333 =−−−−+−+−=∂
∂
<+
)'E(U)pp()F()'D(Up)F()'A(Upt)E(U)D(Up
S
W SYS
Y
Y
PS
Y'CSD
D
DD
α
 [22] 
where 03 <
DSp . According to expression [21], at equilibrium, the welfare cost of 
marginally increasing YD caused by a higher level of p, [ ] 0333 <− )E(U)D(Up DY , is 
exactly compensated for by the welfare benefit of increasing tax compliance keeping the 
tax audit probability constant. However, according to expression [22], the welfare 
benefit that leads to an increase in SD due to a lower level of p is compensated by the 
welfare cost when the tax audit probability remains constant. In any case, note that as 
long as collaboration between tax administrations is imperfect (see again fn. 18), 
nothing prevents incongruity from being an optimal strategy for the taxpayer. 
In order to ascertain under what circumstances it is more likely that DD Y'CS <+  is an 
optimal strategy from the taxpayer's point of view, we can obtain the following 
necessary condition using expressions [21] and [22]: 
)F()'D(Up)F()'A(Up)'E(U)pp()F()'D(Up)F()'A(Up S
SYSYS
Y
Y 11111 33333333333 −+−<−−<−+− αα
 [23] 
so 
)()'A(Up)()'D(Up Y
Y
S
S αα −<− 11 3333  [24] 
Note that if the tax audit probability functions are symmetric, for DD Y'CS <+ , YS pp 33 > . 
In general, expression [24] implies that all the tax parameters referring to personal 
income tax have to be more stringent than those referring to wealth tax, i.e. YS αα >  and 
PR tt >  (and, leaving aside the assumption of symmetry, also p
Y>pS). For instance, if we 
suppose that 1<SY ,αα , but SY αα = , it can be shown that expression [24] necessarily 
implies PR t't > , since only then )'D(U)'A(U 33 > . Thus, given YS pp 33 >  and supposing 
SY αα = , a necessary condition for it to be optimal for a taxpayer to evade less taxes in 
personal income tax than in wealth tax is simply that the tax rate of the former is lower 
than the tax rate of the latter, weighted by the marginal propensity to save. The 
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reduction in disposable income thus has to be relatively greater when the tax 
administration responsible for personal income tax audits than when the other tax 
administration does21. On the whole, unlike the case of perfect collaboration, SD and YD 
are no longer perfect substitutes with respect to the optimal decision over tax evasion. 
a) … when it is optimal to be congruent 
Optimal level of tax base declared 
In the case of congruity and imperfect collaboration, the FOC is obtained from the 
following maximisation problem: 
'CSYs.t. Y,S
'WMax
DDDD +=         
          
 
where E)pp(DpAp'W SYSY −−++= 1 , and A, D and E have been previously defined by 
expressions [15], [16] and [17], respectively. Now, unlike the case of perfect 
collaboration, net income is not the same after having audited each tax administration, 
i.e., DA ≠ . Once we have substituted DY  into W’, we obtain the following FOC with 
respect to SD: 
{ } { }
( )PRSY
PSR
S
YPR
Y
t't)'E(U)pp(
)F(t)F('t)'D(Up)F(t)F('t)'A(Up
+−−=
=−+−+−+−
1         
1111 αα
 [25] 
As long as marginal income is positive in states A and D, the left-hand side of the 
equation (first row) can be defined as the marginal cost of evading taxes (or marginal 
benefit of tax compliance), while the right-hand side (second row) is the marginal 
benefit of evading taxes (or marginal cost of tax compliance). Nevertheless, as we 
already know (see, e.g., expression [18]), marginal income is not always positive (i.e., 
                                                          
21 In fact, in our static model where the initial stock of wealth is null (see fn. 3), this seems to be 
the most plausible assumption, since the marginal tax rates of wealth tax tend to be much lower 
than those of personal income tax, and in addition, the tax base of the former is just a percentage 
(1-β) of the tax base of the latter. However, as long as we were dealing with a dynamic model 
which had made possible the accumulation of a stock of wealth, although the tax rate of wealth 
tax were lower than the tax rate of personal income tax, the tax base of wealth tax (now a real 
stock of wealth) could be large enough in terms of current personal income as to make wealth 
tax a greater burden than personal income tax, and so SD+C’>YD could equally be a plausible 
optimal strategy for the taxpayer. 
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0
>
≤
DD SS D,A ). As long as one of the summands of the first row has a negative sign, it 
should therefore be considered as a marginal benefit of tax evasion and not as a 
marginal cost of tax evasion22. 
From now on, we will assume that SD<S, which requires that expression [7] holds, in 
this case applied to the case of imperfect collaboration between tax administrations,  
{ } { } PRYYSPSSYR t't)pp(Ft)pp(F't +<+++ αα  [26] 
Expression [26] therefore has the same interpretation as the classical condition that 
guarantees an inner solution, i.e. the summation of the penalties expected when the 
taxpayer decreases tax compliance and is caught evading taxes (the left-hand side of the 
inequality) is smaller than the certain amount of taxes due when the taxpayer increases 
tax compliance (the right-hand side of the inequality)23.  
Comparative statics 
We will first analyse how the tax base declared, SD, varies in the face of an increase in 
F. Nevertheless, given that in this case the exercise of comparative statics is much more 
cumbersome than when collaboration between tax administrations is perfect, and given 
that we are only interested in the sign of each reaction, we will make use of the fact that  
DS
FD
dF
dS
Φ−
Φ
=  [27] 
where Φ  is the FOC of the taxpayer's maximization problem (expression [25]). Since 
the SOC of the maximisation problem does indeed hold24, 0<Φ
DS , 
                                                          
22 Obviously, it cannot be the case that those two summands are negative at the same time, since 
then there would not be a solution to the maximization problem. 
 
23 In any case, as expected, the condition given by expression [26] is less stringent than the 
classical one, pF<1. This can be easily shown once expression [26] is re-written as follows: 
 
{ } 1111 <−+−
+
− )(Fpt)(Fp't
t't
pF Y
Y
PS
S
R
PR
αα  [26’] 
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{ }
{ } 0111-           
11
22
2
<+−−−−+−
−−+−−=Φ
)t't)(E(R)'E(U)pp()F(t)F('t)D(R)'D(Up
)F(t)F('t)A(R)'A(Up
PR
YS
PSR
S
YPR
Y
SD
α
α
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{ } { }FsigndFdSsign D ∂Φ∂= , we will therefore simply have to calculate the partial 
derivative F∂Φ∂ , and the same for the other parameters of the model. Hence, 
[ ] { } { }[ ]
{ }
[ ]
0         
11
111         
11         
111
≥++
++






−+−
−+−−+−−
+
++−−+−−+
++−+−−−+−=Φ
)'tt()'D(Up
)t't(
)F(t)F('t
)F(t)F('t)'D(Up)t't()'E(U)pp(
t't()A(R))(YY)(t't()'E(U)pp(
t't)A(Rt't)D(R))(YY()F(t)F('t)'D(Up
SRP
S
YPR
YPR
PSR
S
PR
SY
YPRDPR
SY
YPRPSRDPSR
S
F
α
α
α
α
αβ
ααβα
 [28] 
Both a substitution and an income effect mean that the optimal reaction of the taxpayer 
is unambiguously positive. The first two rows show the latter effect, which is always 
positive, and thus in favor of increasing DS . This is so since, on the one hand, in the 
case in which 011 <−+− )F(t)F('t PSR α , )D(R)A(R > and SRPYPR 'ttt't αα +>+ , 
while the reverse is true when )F(t)F('t)F(t)F('t PSRYPR 11011 −+−<<−+− αα , 
which ensures the positive sign of the first row. On the other hand, when 
011 >−+− )F(t)F('t PSR α and 011 >−+− )F(t)F('t YPR α , the income effect is also 
positive, which can be easily checked if F∂Φ∂  is analysed without making use of the 
FOC. A substitution effect in favour of increasing DS  is shown in the last two rows of 
expression [28]25. 
In the case of an increase in Rt , 
[ ] [ ] [ ]{ }
[ ]{ }
[ ]{ } 01211
11
1
11
≥
<
−−+−+−−−
−+−
+
+−+−+−−+
+−−+−−+−−=
)F()(U(D)'p))U(E)'(pp(
)(Ft)(F't
Ft      
)YR(A)F(YYR(E)R(A))t')U(E)'(tpp(      
)YF(YR(D)R(A)YR(D)R(A))(Ft)(F'tU(D)'pΦ
SYSY
S
Y
SY
YPR
P
DDPR
SY
DSDPSR
S
tR
ααααα
α
αα
 [29] 
In the first two rows, an income effect appears, while in the third row a substitution 
effect appears. On the one hand, as long as 1=Yα , a substitution effect always 
stimulates a decrease in DS , while when 1<Yα , the sign of this effect is ambiguous. 
The reason is as follows: if 1=Yα , SY αα >  (given the hypothesis of imperfect 
                                                           
25 In the third row of expression [28], note that the fraction that appears in brackets is simply 
pYU(A)', which confirms the positive sign of a substitution effect regardless of the sign of 
marginal income in state A and state D.  
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collaboration), and then faced with an increase in Rt the relative benefit of evading taxes 
when collaboration is imperfect increases, since in that case tax evasion in personal 
income tax is not fully discovered in state D, while it is in wealth tax. However, if 
1<Yα , it is not possible to ascertain the sign of the substitution effect, since SY αα >
≤
, 
and the final net effect will also depend on the marginal utility of income in each one of 
the three possible states (A, D and E)26. On the whole, it can be concluded that the lower 
(higher) the level of collaboration of the tax administration responsible for the wealth 
tax with regard to the level of collaboration of the other tax administration, the more 
likely that the increase in tR will tend to promote tax evasion (compliance). Analysis of 
tax evasion in interrelated taxes has therefore enabled the identification of a situation 
(imperfect collaboration between tax administrations) in which the theoretical classical 
results on tax evasion might fail, i.e. an increase in the (marginal) tax rate might not 
produce an increase in tax compliance.   
On the other hand, the net impact of the income effect is more difficult to ascertain due 
to the ambiguity of the sign of the first row of expression [29] when 
011 <−+− )F(t)F('t YPR α , while the sign of the second row is clearly positive, i.e. in 
favor of increasing SD. The reason for this ambiguity is the following: an increase in tR 
will certainly diminish net income both in state A and in state D, and so the valuation of 
marginal income will have increased. However, as long as 011 <−+− )F(t)F('t YPR α , 
marginal increases in SD under state A have to be considered as a marginal cost of tax 
                                                           
26 In fact, the profitability of diminishing the amount of tax base declared, r(-SD), can de defined 
as 






+
+++
−≡−
PR
SY
YP
S
S
Y
R
D t't
)pp(t)pp('tF)S(r αα1 , i.e., assuming that the taxpayer is risk-
neutral, it is calculated as the marginal income that would be obtained by increasing tax evasion 
compared to a situation in which tax evasion is null. As a result, 
)(
)t't)((
pFt
r SY
PR
P
tR
ααβ −+−= 21 , where for simplification we have supposed that 
SY ppp == . It is therefore clear that as long as YS αα < , faced with an increase in Rt , the 
profitability of increasing tax evasion (i.e., reducing SD) has increased, 0>Rtr , while the 
reverse happens when YS αα > . As in the classical analysis, if αS=αY, the substitution effect 
vanishes regardless of whether or not the degree of collaboration between tax administrations is 
perfect. Faced with an increase in the marginal tax rate, imperfect collaboration therefore only 
modifies the profitability of tax evasion as long as both tax administrations do not exert the 
same level of effort in auditing on behalf of the other tax administration. 
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compliance. Unlike the traditional case, given that the marginal impact of the increase 
in tR is greater under state A than under state D, i.e., RR tt DA > , the valuation of the 
marginal cost of tax compliance has therefore increased more than the valuation of the 
marginal benefit of tax compliance (i.e., net income in state D). Under these 
circumstances, for 011 <−+− )F(t)F('t YPR α , a sufficient condition for preventing 
such an ambiguity is that the valuation of the marginal benefit of tax compliance is large 
enough with respect to the valuation of the marginal cost of tax compliance such that 
)A(R)D(RS >α . 
On the whole, the sign of expression [29] is not clear-cut, since a substitution and an 
income effect might have contradictory signs. We are thus back at the ambiguity 
originally observed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Note for instance that if 1=Yα , 
a substitution effect stimulates a decrease in SD, while an income effect stimulates in the 
opposite direction, since for 1=Yα , there is no ambiguity with regard to the income 
effect. 
In the case of an increase in Pt , 
[ ] [ ] [ ]{ }
[ ]{ }
[ ]{ } 01211
11
         
-(1         
11
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−−+−+−−−
−+−
−
−−+−+−+
+−−+−−+−−=Φ
)(F)()'D(Up)()'E(U)pp(
)(Fαt)(F't
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 [30] 
As long as 1=Yα , a substitution effect always provides incentives for increasing DS , 
while when 1<Yα , the sign of the substitution effect is ambiguous. The reasoning is 
identical to the one given above with respect to 
RtΦ , although the signs are obviously 
reversed27. In the first two rows, an income effect appears, the sign of which is again 
ambiguous. In this case, the ambiguity comes from those situations in which 
011 <−+− )F('t)F(t SRP α , with )D(R)A(RY >α  a being sufficient condition to avoid 
it.  
                                                           
27 Following the methodology used in the previous footnote, 02 >
≤
−
+
= )(
)t't(
p'Ftr YS
PR
R
tP
αα . 
 25
In the case of an increase in Yp , 
{ } 011
>
≤
++−+−=Φ )tt()'E(U)F(t)F('t)'A(U PRYPRpY α  [31] 
Only a substitution effect is at work. As long as 011 >−+− )F(t)F('t YPR α , an increase 
in Yp always leads to an increase in DS . Otherwise, the sign is ambiguous. 
Paradoxically, an increase in Yp might be welcome by the taxpayer as long as the tax 
administration dealing with personal income tax does not collaborate to a great extent 
with the other tax administration, and then given the value of the rest of relevant 
parameters, 011 <−+− )F(t)F('t YPR α . In that case, the expected profitability of 
evading taxes will have increased, since the rise in pY has made more likely a state in 
which, even though one tax administration is auditing, the taxpayer can still obtain 
increases in net income by evading taxes. This is certainly a curious result that stems 
directly from the absence of perfect collaboration between tax administrations. 
Similarly in the case of an increase in Sp , 
{ } 011
>
≤
++−+−=Φ )tt()'E(U)F(t)F('t)'D(U PRPSRp S α  [32] 
Again, as long as 011 >−+− )F(t)F('t PSR αα , the sign is unambiguously positive. 
Otherwise, with only a substitution effect being at work, the reason for the ambiguity is 
the same as the one given above with respect to expression [31]. 
Finally, we are interested in showing how a reinforcement of the collaboration between 
tax administrations varies the level of SD. Firstly, when the tax administration 
responsible for personal income tax increases its auditing effort with respect to the 
wealth tax: 
[ ]{ } 0111
>
≤
−+−−+=Φ )F(t)F('t)SS)(A(RFt)'A(Up YPRDP
Y
Y
αα  [33] 
As long as 011 >−+− )F(t)F('t YPR α , 0>Φ Yα , as otherwise, the sign is ambiguous. A 
substitution effect always stimulates an increase in tax compliance, 0>PY Ft)'A(Up , 
while the sign of an income effect can go either way, depending on the sign of marginal 
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income in state A. In the event that 011 <−+− )F(t)F('t YPR α , a reinforcement of 
collaboration by the tax administration responsible for personal income tax certainly 
reduces net income in state A, which increases the valuation of a marginal cost of tax 
compliance. As a consequence of the increase in that marginal valuation, there is an 
incentive to decrease the level of tax compliance.  
Secondly, we analyse the variation in SD when the tax administration responsible for the 
wealth tax increases its auditing effort with respect to personal income tax: 
[ ]{ } 0111
>
≤
−+−−+=Φ )F(t)F('t)SS)(D(R'Ft)'D(Up PSRDR
S
S
αα  [34] 
If 011 >−+− )F(t)F('t PSR α , 0>Φ Sα , as otherwise, the sign is ambiguous. The reason 
for this ambiguity is identical to that given above with respect to expression [33]. 
Undoubtedly, the results of the comparative statics concerning collaboration between 
tax administrations are quite interesting. An increase in collaboration between tax 
administrations is always a good thing in the sense that it promotes higher levels of tax 
compliance only as long as marginal net income is positive in all those states where one 
tax administration is auditing (so, note that it is not strictly necessary that αi=1). 
Otherwise, paradoxically, an increase in collaboration between tax administrations 
might produce a lower level of tax compliance! In Figure 3, on the left-hand side, there 
is the level of αS from which an increase in αS creates a substitution and an income 
effect that unambiguously promotes tax compliance. Similarly, on the right-hand side, 
there is the threshold with respect to the level of collaboration of the tax administration 
responsible for personal income tax, αY. 
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FIGURE 3: When an increase in collaboration between tax administrations promotes 
less tax compliance 
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b) … when it is optimal to be incongruent 
When collaboration between tax administrations is not perfect and incongruity between 
tax returns conditions the tax audit probability, the taxpayer might find it optimal not to 
be congruent. In this section, we will simply try to sketch how this strategy affects the 
results of the comparative statics, while the methodology of numerical simulation will 
complement this initial analysis. 
Optimal level of tax base declared 
We will analyse the case in which YD>SD+C. The objective function of the taxpayer 
does not vary with respect to the previous case. There are thus still three possible states: 
A, D and E (expressions [15], [16] and [17], respectively), but now the tax audit 
probability for each of those three states is endogenous. Moreover, there are two 
decision variables: SD and YD. Taking all this into account, the FOC’s of the 
maximization problem are the following: 
[ ] { } 0111  =−−−−+−+− )'E(U)pp()F()'D(Up)F()'A(Upt)E(U)D(Up:Y SYSSYRYD D α  
 [35] 
[ ] { } 0111  =−−−−+−+−− )'E(U)pp()F()'D(Up)F()'A(Upt)E(U)D(Up:S SYSYYPYD D α
 [36] 
where 0>
DY
p . In fact, given that YD>SD+C, an increase in YD provokes a greater tax 
audit probability in wealth tax, 0>SYDp ; while in the same situation, an increase in SD 
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brings about a smaller tax audit probability in that tax, 0<SS Dp . However, given the 
assumption of symmetry, SSSY DD pp = . This is why, in expression [36], we have used 
0)(<−
DYp  instead of DSp , while the super-index s has been suppressed for clarity of 
exposition. 
Expression [35] can be rewritten as follows:    
{ } [ ] )'E(U)pp(t)E(U)D(Up)F()'D(Up)F()'A(Upt SYRYSSYR D −−+−−=−+− 111 α
 [35'] 
On the left-hand side, the marginal benefit of tax compliance appears, and on the right-
hand side, the marginal cost of tax compliance.  The new feature compared to the case 
in which congruity is optimal is the additional marginal cost incurred by the the 
taxpayer when tax compliance increases, [ ] 0>−− )E(U)D(Up
DY . Incongruity implies 
that an increase in YD causes a higher level of p, and so a loss of welfare since 
U(E)>U(D). However, in expression [36], an increase in SD brings about a higher level 
of welfare due to the decrease in p. Finally, note that as long as )F/(S 1<α , the second 
summand of the left-hand side in expression [35'] must be considered to be a marginal 
cost of tax compliance, and equally in expression [36] for )F/(Y 1<α . 
Incongruity implicitly prevents SD=S and YD=Y from being an optimal strategy for the 
taxpayer. In order to obtain an inner solution, the following conditions should thus hold: 
0                  0 <
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
<=<= YY,SSDYY,SSD DDDD
Y
W;
S
W  [37a] 
0                  0 <
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
=<=< YY,SSDYY,SSD DDDD
Y
W;
S
W  [37b] 
and from now on, we assume that they hold, meaning that an interior solution is 
obtained from the taxpayer's maximization problem. 
Comparative statics 
We will skip the comparative statics analysis corresponding for situation of incongruity 
due to its difficulty, which is mainly caused by the cross-effects between declared tax 
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bases (YD and SD). Instead, we will carry it out by means of a numerical simulations 
exercise. However, before that, it might be useful to briefly analyse the main difference 
with respect to the situation in which congruity is optimal. From expression [35], we 
thus define the cost of incongruity, K, as 
[ ] 0>−≡ )D(U)E(UpK
DY
 [38] 
From this definition, it is easily verifiable that an increase either in Sα , tR, tP, F, pS or in 
the sensitiveness of this latter variable with respect to incongruity28 will lead to an 
increase in the cost of incongruity. Leaving aside the corresponding income and 
substitution effects, and with the initial situation therefore being one in which YD>SD+C, 
the rise in K should lead to a reduction in YD and/or an increase in SD, i.e., a decrease in 
the level of incongruity. Another new effect at work is a substitution effect between the 
tax bases declared. Given that they are independently decided, as long as one parameter 
exclusively affects one tax base (e.g., the statutory tax rate), it will tend to encourage an 
increase/decrease in tax compliance with that tax base compared to the other one. When 
interpreting the results of the numerical simulations, these two new effects will 
therefore have to be taken into account join with the income and substitution effects 
already identified in the theoretical analysis. 
 
3. Numerical simulations 
The methodology of numerical simulations must be helpful in addressing some key 
issues that were not totally solved by means of the theoretical analysis. Among those 
issues are the following: 
- Does the approach of considering tax evasion in interrelated taxes overcome, at least 
partially, the paradox of tax evasion? 
- Given this theoretical approach and considering the possibility of imperfect 
collaboration between tax administrations, in which circumstances is incongruity 
between tax returns an optimal choice for the taxpayer?; and finally, 
                                                           
28 Later, in the numerical simulation exercises, such sensitivity will be denoted by h. 
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- The numerical simulations should be helpful in solving the inconclusive results of the 
analytical comparative statics. 
In order to carry out the numerical simulations, we will employ the following well-
known iso-elastic utility function: 
1 ,Y)Y(U NN ≠
−
=
−
σ
σ
σ
1
1
 [39] 
where )0(>σ is the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion, and YN is net income after 
paying taxes, and in the presence of tax evasion is also the corresponding fine per unit 
of tax evaded. The greater the value of σ , the greater the degree of risk-aversion. 
According to the economic literature, a reasonable value of this parameter is 1.8 (see 
Karni and Schmeidler, 1990; Epstein, 1992). 
The remaining values given to the basic parameters of the model are the following: 
2 0.005;0.5; ;2.0 ;8.0 ;1 ====== F ttSY PRβ  
The aim of these numerical simulations is not to replicate any real situation. That is why 
the value of the above parameters do not necessarily reflect those of any potentially 
average taxpayer. However, the value of the tax audit probability will be obtained from 
the model in such a way that the equilibrium values of tax evasion ( SSYY DD / and / ) 
range within a reasonable interval, as we will confirm below.  
In the presence of incongruity, e.g. DD S)(Y >− β1 , the tax audit probability of the 
wealth tax will adopt the following function: 
[ ])S)(Y(hexppp DDSS −−××= β1  [40] 
where h>0. In the presence of incongruity, the higher the value of h, the higher the value 
of pS above its normal level ( Sp ). Similarly, in the case that DD S)(Y <− β1 , 
[ ]))(YS(hexppp DDYY β−−××= 1  [40’] 
In order to make the impact of wealth tax on net income significant in money terms, 
apart from the increase in wealth due to annual savings (S), we have assumed that at the 
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beginning of the fiscal year the taxpayer owned an initial amount of wealth, S0 (>0) (see 
fn. 3). Therefore, leaving tax evasion aside, the budget constraint becomes as follows 
PRD t)SS(tYY 0+−−  [41] 
Throughout all the numerical simulations, we will suppose that S0=229. Moreover, in 
order to keep things as simple as possible and thus focusing exclusively on the 
relationship between S and Y, we will assume that the taxpayer always declares the 
whole amount of the initial stock of wealth30.  
Paradox of tax evasion 
The traditional analysis of tax evasion predicts very low levels of tax compliance, a 
situation that does not seem to hold true in practice. As we said in the introduction, in 
order to try to overcome this paradox, the literature on tax evasion has proposed several 
alternative explanations. It is in this context that we propose a new one. We therefore 
postulate that considering tax evasion in interrelated taxes can at least partially, help to 
solve this paradox. In fact, intuitively it seems that as long as the tax instruments of the 
interrelated taxes are (relatively) coordinated, they should positively interact with each 
other, making tax evasion less attractive (as we know, this is the idea which bases the 
so-called “self-reinforcing penalty system of taxes” due to Shoup (1969)).  
[TABLE 1a] 
In Table 1a, we show the first results of this exercise of numerical simulation. We have 
characterised a situation with tax evasion both in the personal income tax, YD=0.8 given 
Y=1, and in the wealth tax, SD=0.16 given S=0.2, and in order to facilitate comparison 
with previous results of the literature, declared tax bases are congruous for 8.0=β . 
Next, we obtained the value of the audit probability compatible with this level of tax 
evasion, supposing that the taxpayer aims at maximizing the utility function [39]. 
                                                           
29 This implies that the initial stock of wealth subject to taxation is double current income. That 
seems a reasonable assumption, once we take into account that the tax law usually allows the 
deduction of a certain sum of money in the calculus of the tax base. S0 must thus be considered 
as the initial stock of wealth after this sum of money has already been deducted. 
 
30 This assumption will prove extremely useful in the numerical simulations in order to isolate 
an income effect. 
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However, the results of the numerical simulation certainly depend on the assumptions 
regarding the context of tax evasion. Under the label Classical analysis, the model of 
tax evasion employed coincides with the original model by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972), and thus each decision of tax evasion is considered separately. The 
maximization problem is therefore solved for each tax, such that pY and pS are obtained 
given the values of the basic parameters of the model31. Since each decision is 
considered separately, there is no reason to treat both events (auditing of the personal 
income tax return and auditing of the wealth tax return) as mutually exclusive. That is 
why, the probability of occurrence of either event is calculated as (pY+pS)-(pY×pS). In the 
other simulated situations, tax evasion in interrelated taxes is the behaviour under 
analysis (Interrelated Evasion), having analysed, firstly, the situation in which 
collaboration between tax administrations is perfect; and secondly, the situations in 
which collaboration is imperfect. 
In the Classical analysis, in order to ensure the aforementioned levels of tax 
compliance, the sum of tax audit probabilities has to be as high as 0.6625, while in the 
case of Interrelated Evasion and perfect collaboration, that level is “only” 0.321232. 
Nonetheless, as long as collaboration is imperfect, the tax audit probability might be 
higher or lower than the value obtained in the Classical analysis. Taxes might therefore 
interact negatively with each other, leading to a decrease in the level of tax compliance 
as long as collaboration is imperfect. This prevents Shoup (1969)’s idea of the “self-
reinforcing penalty system of taxes” from being universal, since it depends on the 
degree of collaboration between tax administrations. This negative possibility does not 
therefore come about when either tax administration is carrying out the maximum level 
of collaboration ( 1=iα ), and becomes a case that is identical to one of perfect 
collaboration. Table 2a illustrates the same cases as Table 1a, but for a situation of full 
tax compliance (i.e., 11 == S/S and Y/Y DD ). 
[TABLE 2a] 
                                                           
31 The method used to solve the system of non-linear equations is the so-called “Gauss-
Newton”. 
 
32 As we know from the theoretical analysis, when collaboration between tax administrations is 
perfect, we only have p, and so from the numerical simulations it is not possible to ascertain the 
value of pY and pS, but only pY+pS. 
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The values obtained for tax audit probabilities that are shown in both tables are certainly 
very high, and are obviously highest in Table 2a. For example, Bernasconi (1998), pp. 
127-6, argues that in order to be in line with those in force in many countries, the 
individual tax audit probabilities should range from 0.01 to 0.03, whereas 0.09 might be 
the average for USA taxpayers (Harris, 1987). From the results of our numerical 
simulations, we should therefore conclude that Interrelated Evasion does not solve the 
paradox of tax evasion, since in order to ensure full tax compliance, p (defined as pY+pS) 
has to be as high as 0.5 when collaboration is perfect (Table 2a), and 0.3212 in order to 
guarantee a level of tax compliance of 80% (Table 1a). Nevertheless, there is another 
way to read our results, which is by comparing those absolute values with those 
obtained in the Classical analysis, 0.75 and 0.66, respectively. Our approach might thus 
be considered as a partial explanation to the paradox of tax evasion, since our tax audit 
probabilities are around half those predicted by the Classical analysis. 
[TABLE 1b] 
[TABLE 2b] 
Bernasconi (1998) also carried out a numerical simulation exercise in order to check 
whether his theory of over-weighted tax audit probabilities for taxpayers - which can be 
justified once different orders of risk aversion are distinguished - was able to overcome 
the paradox of tax evasion. In order to compare his results with ours, in Table 1b and 
Table 2b, we have modified the value of the basic parameters of the previous numerical 
simulation. Now, 0.002 t0.3;t PR ==  (which might be considered as a low bound of 
the range of reasonable values of tP), and F=4, which are the same values as those used 
by Bernasconi (1998) with the obvious exception of tP33. In this case, the equilibrium 
values of the tax auditing probabilities are much lower. For instance, if we merely pay 
                                                           
33 In fact, Bernasconi (1998) set F=3. However, he expressed net income when the taxpayer is 
audited as  
 
)YY(t'FYtY DRR −−−  
 
Given our different way of expressing net income, it is therefore obvious that in our case 
F=F’+1.That is why, using F=4, and given the rest of values of the basic parameters, we are 
exactly replicating Bernasconi (1998)’s simulations. 
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attention to the value of pY, for levels of tax compliance of 80%, when collaboration 
(between taxes or tax administrations) is symmetric and above 0.5, we can see that it 
lies within a relatively reasonable interval (0.096 to 0.0755), and is in any case much 
lower than in the Classical analysis (0.1441)34. Moreover, in this latter analysis, pS 
should be as high as 0.2499, while in the former it should be between 0.1398 and 
0.0820. In fact, although this result does not appear in Table 1b, in the case of 
Interrelated Evasion, a level of tax compliance of 60% is compatible with auditing 
probabilities in each tax as low as 0.03. Additionally, the necessary values of tax 
auditing probabilities are decreasing in S0 (in our case, this is exclusively due to an 
income effect), so for large fortunes (i.e., those taxpayers with a high S0/Y ratio), the tax 
auditing probabilities should be even lower than the values shown in tables35.  
On the whole, from the results of our numerical simulations, it should be concluded that 
considering tax evasion in interrelated taxes permits the paradox of tax evasion to be 
partially overcome, since reasonable levels of tax evasion are compatible with relatively 
low values of the tax auditing probabilities. However, it is very important to note that 
this result is only valid as long as there is a significant degree of collaboration between 
tax administrations.   
Incongruity 
The consideration of tax evasion in interrelated taxes can produce an interesting result. 
As long as collaboration between the tax auditors responsible for each tax is not perfect, 
the tax bases declared in each tax return might not be congruous. This result has already 
been shown in the theoretical part of the paper. However, the numerical simulations 
should still provide us more information. In particular, they should first be useful in 
                                                           
34 Note that the tax audit probabilities rated by Bernasconi (1998) as reasonable, which range 
from 0.01 to 0.03, are an average for taxpayers as a whole. These average values should thus be 
perfectly compatible with much higher (and lower) point values. In this sense, it could be the 
case that those taxpayers that submit a wealth tax return were audited in personal income tax 
more often than any other taxpayer, i.e. it could be the case that their “normal” tax audit 
probability (before considering the possibility of incongruity between tax bases) were above 
those average values. Once we take this possibility into account, a tax auditing probability of 
around 0.07 or even slightly above might not be too far from reality. 
 
35 For instance, for a taxpayer which initial stock of wealth (S0) is 100, maintaining the rest of 
values equal to those in Table 1b, pY+pS=0.1083. However, given that the wealth tax is a 
progressive tax, we would expect tP to be higher than 0.002. Then, for example, for tP=0.005, 
pY+pS=0.0028! 
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indicating which situation is more likely, DD S)(Y >
<
− β1 , and secondly, which 
combination of values of the basic parameters of the model can produce incongruity. 
The benchmark case will be that of Table 1a in which for 75.0== SY αα , 
1848.0=Yp  and 2296.0=Sp  (i.e., pY/pS=0.8049)36, and tax bases are congruous for 
β=0.8. Based on these initial values, we then ask which new combination of tax audit 
probabilities should hold in order for incongruity to become an optimal choice for the 
taxpayer. In Table 3, first we find those situations under which YD(1-β)>SD. As 
expected, while maintaining the rest of parameters constant, that type of situation is 
only compatible with a level of tax enforcement by the tax administration responsible 
for personal income tax that is much higher in relative terms (remember that in this 
situation pS has to be calculated by means of expression [40]). Moreover, the greater the 
level of h, the greater this difference in the relative degree of tax enforcement has to be. 
Secondly, as also shown in Table 3, in the reverse situation, YD(1-β)<SD, those 
differences – now, in favour of pS, while pY has to be calculated by means of expression 
[40’] - have to be even much more acute. In order for the taxpayer to find it optimal to 
be incongruent, keeping the rest of tax parameters unchanged, there must therefore be 
great differences in the relative level of tax enforcement, especially in the situation in 
which YD(1-β)<SD.  
[TABLE 3] 
Next, we carried out the same exercise in Table 4, but this time to detect likely 
differences in the degree of collaboration. Again, in order for YD(1-β)>SD to become an 
optimal strategy for the taxpayer, the endogenous parameter for personal income tax, 
Sα , has to be greater than the one for wealth tax, Yα . This difference must also increase 
as the value of h increases. Curiously, the smaller the value of Yα , the greater the value 
of Sα . This result, which might seem counterintuitive, can be easily understood from 
                                                           
36 As we already know, these values seem quite high in comparison with those in force in many 
countries. However, for the purposes of this section, this is not an important issue, since what 
we are really interested in is in the relative differences of tax enforcement necessary in order for 
incongruity to become an optimal strategy for the taxpayer. In any case, note that as long as we 
set F=4, as Bernasconi (1998) did (see also fn. 33), the tax audit probabilities would be much 
lower, pY=0.0821 and pS=0.1001 (see Table 1b). 
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expression [24]. In this expression, while keeping the other parameters unchanged, a 
decrease in Yα  should certainly permit a smaller value of Sα  such that the sign of the 
inequality could still hold. However, note that as long as Yα  decreases, marginal utility 
in state A decreases as well, while marginal utility in state D remains unchanged. The 
combination of those facts might make thus an even greater value of Sα  necessary. 
Finally, in Table 4, we can check that the situation YD(1-β)<SD is not compatible with 
differences in the degree of tax enforcement that remain within the boundaries of Yα , 
since both for Sα =0.75 and Sα =0.25, the value of Yα  in those cases should be above 1. 
[TABLE 4] 
In conclusion, the results of these numerical simulations confirm those already obtained 
in the theoretical analysis i.e. incongruity as an optimal strategy for the taxpayer is only 
possible as long as the level of tax parameters of each tax is sufficiently different. 
Moreover, these differences must be more acute as the tax audit probabilities become 
more sensitive to the degree of incongruity. From the analysis of the numerical 
simulations, it is possible to infer that incongruity is much more likely as long as there 
are differences in the degree of collaboration (which not only produces a substitution 
effect between states, but also an income effect), since otherwise the differences in the 
tax audit probabilities probably have to be too sharp to hold in practice. In any case, 
note that if we focus either on the ratio pY/pS or on the ratio αS/αY, the most likely 
situation is one in which YD(1-β)>SD. It is precisely this situation that will be analysed 
in the following exercises of comparative statics. 
Comparative statics 
The numerical simulation exercise will prove extremely useful for analysing the results 
of the comparative statics in the case of incongruity. However, before that exercise, and 
despite all the signs of the comparative statics being perfectly clear from the theoretical 
analysis, in Table 5, we show the results in the case of Interrelated Evasion and perfect 
collaboration such that YD(1-β)=SD. In the first column, the values of the variable on 
which the exercise of comparative statics is based appear; in the second and third 
column, the equilibrium values of the tax bases declared; in the fourth, the percentage of 
tax compliance, while in the fifth column this percentage is expressed in money terms 
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with respect to the amount of money that would be collected in the presence of full tax 
compliance37. Finally, in the sixth column, we have calculated expected net income, 
after paying taxes and, in the presence of tax evasion, the corresponding fine per unit of 
tax evaded38. 
[TABLE 5] 
In fact, the only new results that appear in Table 5 are the comparative statics with 
respect to σ and S0. In both cases, the sign is also positive. An increase in S0 produces a 
reduction in net income in all the states, which given the assumption of decreasing risk 
aversion forces the taxpayer to increase tax compliance. Obviously, an increase in σ 
automatically generates the same reaction by the taxpayer. 
In the Appendix, we have included the whole set of numerical simulations carried out 
for a situation in which YD(1-β)>SD. The structure of the tables is the same as in Table 5, 
with the exception of two new definitions, which are the ratio between pS and the 
“normal” level of pS, Sp ; and the level of incongruity, ((1-β)-(SD/YD))/(1-β).  
The values of the basic parameters used in the numerical simulations make marginal 
income in states A and D always positive. On the one hand, the income effect detected 
in the theoretical analysis will therefore always favour an increase in tax compliance. 
On the other hand, a substitution effect always had a clear impact in favour of 
increasing tax compliance with the exception of those cases in which tR or tP varied. 
This latter ambiguity was caused by potential discrepancies in the level of collaboration 
between tax administrations (see, e.g., fn. 26). In the numerical simulations, we will see 
to what extent that potential situation can produce a decrease in tax compliance. These 
basic results apply in the case of congruity. Nonetheless, in the case of incongruity, 
because of the cross-effects between SD and YD, it may be the case that despite global 
tax compliance increasing, either of the declared tax bases decreases. In any case, it 
should be recalled that the effect that occurs through variations in the cost of 
incongruity, K, also has to be taken into account as long as h>0. 
As can be seen from tables A.5 and A.4, an increase in h or in pS, respectively, causes a 
                                                           
37 That is, (((SD+S0)×tP)+ (YD×tR))/ (((S+S0) ×tP)+ (Y×tR)). 
 
38 Note that due to S0>0, in some cases nothing prevents net income from being negative.  
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higher level of unweighted tax compliance through a small reduction in YD and an 
important increase in SD. In both cases, the cost of incongruity has augmented, calling 
for an increase in the ratio SD/YD. Moreover, the increase in that cost has occurred by 
means of an increase in the effective tax audit probability of the tax administration 
responsible for the wealth tax, making tax compliance in that tax relatively more 
attractive. Both effects therefore stimulate increasing SD over YD. Obviously, this 
increase is greater, as the value of αY increases.  
In Table A.10, it is interesting to analyse the consequences of an increase in S0. Given 
that S0 is fully declared, only an income effect is at work. Such an income effect causes 
an increase in the level of tax compliance weighted by the relative importance of the tax 
burden of each tax (in the table, denoted by (SD+YD)r). This increase in the level of tax 
compliance is achieved by means of a decrease in the ratio SD/YD. This result will 
therefore be useful in comparative static analysis where an income effect arises. 
An increase in αY (Table A.8) or in αS (Table A.7) provokes the same effect both on 
total tax compliance and on each one of the tax bases declared than in the case of an 
increase in h or in pS. However, the reasoning is not exactly the same as the one given 
above. On the one hand, an increase in αY does not modify the cost of incongruity, since 
it does not change the value of marginal income neither in state D nor in state E. 
However, it certainly makes it more attractive to increase SD compared to YD, while at 
the same time generating an income effect in favour of increasing total tax compliance 
(in particular, as we already know that occurs through increases in YD). In this case, a 
substitution effect between tax bases therefore prevails over an income effect. On the 
other hand, an increase in αS makes incongruity more costly, thereby stimulating an 
increase in the ratio SD/YD. But, at the same time, both an income effect and a 
substitution effect between tax bases provide incentives for in the contrary direction. In 
this case the increase in the cost of incongruity therefore overcomes the impact of the 
latter two effects. 
In the remaining cases, the results of the comparative statics show an incentive to 
increase YD and to decrease SD. In Table A.3, we can see how an increase in pY causes a 
substitution effect in favor of increasing tax compliance, and in particular decreasing the 
ratio SD/YD, while the cost of incongruity remains unchanged. The results concerning F 
are shown in Table A.9. An increase in F intensifies the cost of incongruity, thereby 
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promoting a rise in the ratio SD/YD. However, a substitution and an income effect in 
favour of increasing tax compliance predominate in the sense that this increase in tax 
compliance is achieved by a reduction in the ratio SD/YD.  
Finally, an increase in any one of the statutory tax rates generates an income effect, 
which as we know favours a decrease in SD/YD, although total weighted tax compliance 
increases (tables A.1 and A.2). Moreover, in both cases, the cost of incongruity raises, 
thereby promoting an increase in SD/YD. Given that the degree of collaboration between 
tax administrations is quite similar, we do not expect a substitution effect in favor of 
decreasing total tax compliance (see expressions [29] and [30]), but only a relative 
increase in the level of tax compliance of the tax base that has suffered an increase in its 
tax burden (i.e., a substitution effect between tax bases declared). In the particular case 
of tR, the decrease in SD/YD is therefore a consequence of the predomination of an 
income effect and a substitution effect between tax bases over the increase in the cost of 
incongruity; while in the case of tP an income effect prevails over the other two effects. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper has been to analyse the consequences of considering the 
decision of tax evasion as a decision in which interrelated taxes (e.g., at the individual 
level, personal income tax and wealth tax, but a similar analysis could also be applied to 
the case of corporations, given the evident relationship between the VAT and corporate 
tax) interact with each other, and so the optimal level of tax compliance from the point 
of view of the taxpayer might differ with respect to those analyses in which tax evasion 
is considered tax by tax. In particular, the source of interaction arises from the 
information available to the tax administration as long as it compares the tax bases 
declared in each tax return. Given the evident relationship between tax bases (e.g., the 
increase in the wealth tax base with respect to the previous fiscal year should be a 
reasonable proportion of current income), that comparison should make any incongruity 
evident, and so it could be a hint to start an auditing process. In the paper, such an 
incongruity produces an increase in the auditing probability of the tax with a tax base 
that has supposedly been under-declared. However, given the possibility that those 
interrelated taxes were audited by different tax administrations or within a tax 
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administration by different departments, we have also analysed those situations in which 
collaboration between different tax administrations or between different departments of 
the same tax administration is imperfect. In the extreme case in which collaboration is 
null, this means that each tax administration might certainly obtain valuable information 
from comparing tax returns, but it does not make any effort to enforce tax obligations on 
behalf of the other tax administration/department when carrying out its own tax audits. 
On the contrary, perfect collaboration exactly replicates that situation in which there is a 
single tax administration or just one department responsible for both taxes. 
The idea of interaction between taxes as a means of reinforcing tax compliance was 
suggested by Shoup (1969), but it had never been formally developed. Moreover, taking 
the possibility of imperfect collaboration into account can certainly affect the originally 
expected results. In the case of perfect collaboration between tax administrations, our 
theoretical analysis shows that congruity between tax bases is the only optimal decision 
for the taxpayer, while the results of the comparative statics do not vary from the 
classical analysis (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974). In that context, as 
expected, interrelated taxes slightly reinforce each other, making it possible to achieve 
higher levels of tax compliance maintaining the level of tax enforcement constant39. 
However, that result – which has been obtained from a numerical simulation exercise - 
might be reversed for low levels of collaboration. This type of analysis has also enabled 
us to shed some new light on the paradox of tax evasion. By also employing the 
methodology of numerical simulations, we have shown that using values of the penalty 
per unit of tax evaded equal to those previously used by the literature (Bernasconi, 
1998), it is possible to obtain relatively reasonable values of the levels of tax 
enforcement compatible with reasonable values of tax compliance. Nonetheless, that 
result is again crucially dependent on the existence of high levels of collaboration 
between tax administrations. Interrelated tax evasion might be at least considered as a 
partial explanation to the paradox of tax evasion. 
Indeed, the degree of collaboration between tax administrations becomes crucial in the 
results concerning tax evasion in interrelated taxes. In fact, when collaboration is 
                                                           
39 For example, note that in Table 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b in the presence of perfect collaboration, 
lower levels of tax enforcement are compatible with equal levels of tax compliance in the 
situation of interrelated tax evasion and in the classical analysis., Keeping the same level of tax 
enforcement, in the former situation tax compliance will thus be greater than in the latter one. 
 
 41
imperfect, our theoretical analysis has shown that incongruity might be an optimal 
choice for a rational taxpayer. The direction of the incongruity depends on the relative 
importance of the tax parameters of each tax. We should thus expect relatively lower 
levels of tax compliance in those taxes in which the tax parameters (including the tax 
auditing probability and the level of collaboration of the other tax administration) are 
relatively less important. For example, in the case of personal income tax and wealth 
tax, we expect the level of tax compliance to be more important in the former tax than in 
the latter40. 
The results of the comparative statics are also crucially affected by the degree of 
collaboration. In the case of imperfect collaboration, theoretical analysis does not 
provide clear-cut results, and the methodology of numerical simulations becomes 
fundamental in ascertaining its effects. Moreover, this analysis depends on whether 
congruity or incongruity is the optimal decision of the taxpayer. Our numerical 
simulations have been performed for what is probably the most interesting case, i.e. the 
one in which incongruity is optimal. As a general result, it is worth mentioning that 
there is no tax policy that promotes tax compliance with both taxes at the same time. 
Additionally, although as stated in the introduction, our aim is not to characterise the 
optimal policies of a tax administration, it is also interesting to stress that on some 
occasions the incentives for a tax administration to carry out certain policies are null. 
For instance, we have found that as long as the tax administration responsible for 
personal income tax strengthens its collaboration with the other tax administration, the 
level of tax compliance in that tax decreases, while it increases in wealth tax (see Table 
A.8). We should therefore see very low levels of collaboration on that tax 
administration’s side. Precisely the reverse incentives hold for the other tax 
administration (see Table A.7). This analysis thus predicts an asymmetric degree of 
collaboration, which is null for the tax administration responsible for personal income 
tax and maximum for the tax administration responsible for wealth tax. Finally, the 
presence of imperfect collaboration, unlike the case of perfect collaboration, might 
produce negative externalities between tax administrations. For instance, an increase in 
the statutory tax rate of personal income tax promotes a higher level of tax compliance 
in that tax, but at the same time a decrease in the level of tax compliance in wealth tax. 
                                                           
40 For example, although it does not appear in Table 4, the impossibility of YD(1-β)<SD is 
independent of the level of S0., i.e. even for very big values of S0, αY is still above 1. 
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On the whole, all these results call for an integration of all the tax auditing processes, or 
as long as the responsibilities of auditing different taxes are assigned to different layers 
of government, they call for a high level of mutual collaboration between tax 
administrations. 
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Appendix 
 
COMPARATIVE STATICS 
(imperfect collaboration) 
 
Table A.1. 
 
tR SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r SS p/p Incongruity E(YN) 
73.0=Yα  
0.41 0.1415 0.7101 0.7097 0.7169 1.0007 0.0035 0.6316 
0.46 0.0936 0.7647 0.7153 0.7691 1.0931 0.3881 0.5778 
0.50 0.0499 0.8006 0.7088 0.8034 1.1799 0.6887 0.5348 
0.54 0.0011 0.8312 0.6935 0.8328 1.2812 0.9937 0.4918 
0.57 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.61 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
75.0=Yα  
0.41 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.46 0.1438 0.7641 0.7566 0.7690 1.0135 0.0587 0.5778 
0.50 0.1000 0.8000 0.7500 0.8033 1.0942 0.3749 0.5349 
0.54 0.0511 0.8306 0.7348 0.8327 1.1884 0.6925 0.4919 
0.57 0.0037 0.8540 0.7148 0.8550 1.2848 0.9782 0.4543 
0.61 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
77.0=Yα  
0.41 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.46 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.50 0.1544 0.7993 0.7948 0.8032 1.0082 0.0340 0.5349 
0.54 0.1054 0.8300 0.7795 0.8326 1.0952 0.3653 0.4919 
0.57 0.0579 0.8534 0.7594 0.8550 1.1844 0.6609 0.4543 
0.61 0.0056 0.8741 0.7332 0.8748 1.2890 0.9679 0.4167 
        n.s.: no solution 
 
 
Table A.2. 
 
tP SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r SS p/p Incongruity E(YN) 
73.0=Yα  
0.0043 0.1485 0.7987 0.7893 0.8020 1.0170 0.0703 0.5351 
0.0046 0.1043 0.7995 0.7532 0.8026 1.0870 0.3476 0.5350 
0.0050 0.0512 0.8006 0.7098 0.8034 1.1776 0.6805 0.5348 
0.0053 0.0119 0.8014 0.6778 0.8040 1.2492 0.9256 0.5347 
0.0058 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.0063 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
75.0=Yα  
0.0043 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.0046 0.1546 0.7989 0.7946 0.8025 1.0078 0.0324 0.5350 
0.0050 0.1000 0.8000 0.7500 0.8033 1.0942 0.3749 0.5349 
0.0053 0.1013 0.8000 0.7511 0.8033 1.0920 0.3667 0.5349 
0.0058 0.0620 0.8008 0.7190 0.8039 1.1587 0.6130 0.5347 
0.0063 0.0034 0.8022 0.6713 0.8049 1.2657 0.9789 0.5345 
77.0=Yα  
0.0043 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.0046 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.0050 0.1557 0.7993 0.7958 0.8032 1.0062 0.0258 0.5349 
0.0053 0.1163 0.8001 0.7637 0.8038 1.0678 0.2733 0.5348 
0.0058 0.0575 0.8015 0.7158 0.8048 1.1667 0.6413 0.5345 
0.0063 0.0038 0.8028 0.6723 0.8058 1.2650 0.9760 0.5343 
        n.s.: no solution 
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Table A.3. 
 
pY SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r SS p/p Incongruity E(YN) 
73.0=Yα  
0.288 0.1524 0.7628 0.7627 0.7674 1.0003 0.0011 0.5485 
0.302 0.1058 0.7807 0.7387 0.7845 1.0785 0.3226 0.5418 
0.318 0.0492 0.8008 0.7083 0.8036 1.1810 0.6926 0.5347 
0.330 0.0040 0.8158 0.6832 0.8178 1.2696 0.9754 0.5299 
0.343 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.355 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
75.0=Yα  
0.288 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.302 0.1559 0.7801 0.7800 0.7844 1.0001 0.0005 0.5418 
0.318 0.0994 0.8002 0.7497 0.8035 1.0953 0.3790 0.5348 
0.330 0.0542 0.8151 0.7244 0.8177 1.1774 0.6677 0.5299 
0.343 0.0019 0.8312 0.6943 0.8329 1.2796 0.9886 0.5251 
0.355 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
77.0=Yα  
0.288 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.302 0.1538 0.7995 0.7944 0.8034 1.0092 0.0382 0.5348 
0.318 0.1086 0.8145 0.7692 0.8176 1.0849 0.3334 0.5300 
0.330 0.0563 0.8305 0.7390 0.8327 1.1790 0.6609 0.5252 
0.343 0.0044 0.8452 0.7080 0.8466 1.2802 0.9741 0.5211 
0.355 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
   n.s.: no solution 
 
 
Table A.4. 
 
pS SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r SS p/p Incongruity E(YN) 
73.0=Yα  
0.0041 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.0044 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.0048 0.0080 0.8009 0.6741 0.8033 1.2563 0.9498 0.5349 
0.0051 0.0473 0.8006 0.7066 0.8034 1.1844 0.7046 0.5348 
0.0056 0.1079 0.8002 0.7568 0.8036 1.0814 0.3259 0.5347 
0.0059 0.1417 0.8000 0.7848 0.8037 1.0279 0.1145 0.5347 
75.0=Yα  
0.0041 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.0044 0.0017 0.8007 0.6687 0.8030 1.2682 0.9891 0.5350 
0.0048 0.0582 0.8003 0.7153 0.8032 1.1652 0.6367 0.5349 
0.0051 0.0975 0.8000 0.7479 0.8033 1.0984 0.3909 0.5349 
0.0056 0.1581 0.7996 0.7981 0.8035 1.0027 0.0114 0.5348 
0.0059 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
77.0=Yα  
0.0041 0.0102 0.8004 0.6755 0.8028 1.2520 0.9361 0.5351 
0.0044 0.0561 0.8000 0.7134 0.8029 1.1687 0.6496 0.5350 
0.0048 0.1125 0.7996 0.7602 0.8031 1.0737 0.2964 0.5349 
0.0051 0.1519 0.7993 0.7927 0.8032 1.0121 0.0500 0.5349 
0.0056 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.0059 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
   n.s.: no solution 
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Table A.5. 
 
h SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r SS p/p Incongruity E(YN) 
73.0=Yα  
1.24 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1.33 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1.41 0.0007 0.8012 0.6683 0.8035 1.2523 0.9956 0.5348 
1.51 0.0548 0.8005 0.7128 0.8034 1.1723 0.6576 0.5348 
1.64 0.1117 0.7998 0.7597 0.8033 1.0823 0.3016 0.5349 
1.77 0.1570 0.7992 0.7969 0.8031 1.0050 0.0177 0.5349 
75.0=Yα  
1.24 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1.33 0.0055 0.8012 0.6722 0.8035 1.2285 0.9659 0.5348 
1.41 0.0540 0.8006 0.7121 0.8034 1.1615 0.6630 0.5348 
1.51 0.1046 0.7999 0.7538 0.8033 1.0872 0.3459 0.5349 
1.64 0.1577 0.7993 0.7975 0.8032 1.0035 0.0134 0.5349 
1.77 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
77.0=Yα  
1.24 0.0058 0.8012 0.6724 0.8035 1.2111 0.9641 0.5348 
1.33 0.0666 0.8004 0.7225 0.8034 1.1324 0.5839 0.5348 
1.41 0.1117 0.7999 0.7597 0.8033 1.0704 0.3016 0.5349 
1.51 0.1587 0.7993 0.7983 0.8032 1.0017 0.0071 0.5349 
1.64 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1.77 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
   n.s.: no solution 
 
 
Table A.6. 
 
σ SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r SS p/p Incongruity E(YN) 
73.0=Yα  
1.50 0.1518 0.7605 0.7603 0.7652 1.0005 0.0020 0.5418 
1.64 0.1022 0.7809 0.7359 0.7847 1.0843 0.3456 0.5383 
1.79 0.0530 0.7995 0.7104 0.8024 1.1739 0.6685 0.5350 
1.96 0.0015 0.8172 0.6823 0.8192 1.2749 0.9907 0.5319 
2.14 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
2.35 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
75.0=Yα  
1.50 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1.64 0.1525 0.7803 0.7773 0.7846 1.0054 0.0230 0.5383 
1.79 0.1032 0.7989 0.7517 0.8022 1.0886 0.3543 0.5350 
1.96 0.0516 0.8166 0.7235 0.8191 1.1825 0.6843 0.5320 
2.14 0.0012 0.8325 0.6948 0.8341 1.2813 0.9927 0.5292 
2.35 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
77.0=Yα  
1.50 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1.64 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1.79 0.1576 0.7982 0.7965 0.8021 1.0031 0.0129 0.5351 
1.96 0.1059 0.8160 0.7682 0.8190 1.0898 0.3514 0.5320 
2.14 0.0554 0.8318 0.7393 0.8340 1.1811 0.6671 0.5292 
2.35 0.0013 0.8474 0.7073 0.8487 1.2869 0.9922 0.5265 
   n.s.: no solution 
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Table A.7. 
 
Sα  SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r SS p/p Incongruity E(YN) 
73.0=Yα  
0.62 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.67 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.71 0.0064 0.8008 0.6727 0.8032 1.2594 0.9599 0.5349 
0.75 0.0499 0.8006 0.7088 0.8034 1.1799 0.6887 0.5348 
0.80 0.1024 0.8004 0.7523 0.8037 1.0904 0.3606 0.5347 
0.85 0.1531 0.8002 0.7944 0.8040 1.0105 0.0434 0.5346 
75.0=Yα  
0.62 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.67 0.0113 0.8004 0.6764 0.8029 1.2500 0.9294 0.5350 
0.71 0.0564 0.8002 0.7138 0.8031 1.1682 0.6477 0.5349 
0.75 0.1000 0.8000 0.7500 0.8033 1.0942 0.3749 0.5349 
0.80 0.1527 0.7997 0.7938 0.8036 1.0109 0.0450 0.5348 
0.85 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
77.0=Yα  
0.62 0.0064 0.8001 0.6721 0.8025 1.2592 0.9602 0.5351 
0.67 0.0653 0.7998 0.7209 0.8028 1.1526 0.5919 0.5350 
0.71 0.1106 0.7996 0.7584 0.8030 1.0768 0.3085 0.5350 
0.75 0.1544 0.7993 0.7948 0.8032 1.0082 0.0340 0.5349 
0.80 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.85 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
   n.s.: no solution 
 
 
Table A.8. 
 
Yα  SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r SS p/p Incongruity E(YN) 
73.0=Sα  
0.700 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.710 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.720 0.0047 0.8010 0.6714 0.8034 1.2627 0.9708 0.5348 
0.764 0.1159 0.7996 0.7629 0.8031 1.0683 0.2754 0.5349 
0.770 0.1327 0.7994 0.7768 0.8031 1.0417 0.1702 0.5349 
0.777 0.1528 0.7992 0.7933 0.8031 1.0106 0.0439 0.5349 
75.0=Sα  
0.700 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.710 0.0034 0.8012 0.6704 0.8035 1.2653 0.9791 0.5348 
0.720 0.0262 0.8009 0.6893 0.8035 1.2226 0.8366 0.5348 
0.764 0.1376 0.7995 0.7809 0.8032 1.0340 0.1394 0.5349 
0.770 0.1544 0.7993 0.7948 0.8032 1.0082 0.0340 0.5349 
0.777 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
77.0=Sα  
0.700 0.0024 0.8014 0.6698 0.8037 1.2672 0.9850 0.5347 
0.710 0.0245 0.8011 0.6880 0.8036 1.2258 0.8472 0.5347 
0.720 0.0474 0.8008 0.7068 0.8036 1.1844 0.7043 0.5348 
0.764 0.1590 0.7994 0.7987 0.8033 1.0013 0.0055 0.5348 
0.770 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
0.777 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
   n.s.: no solution 
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Table A.9. 
 
F SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r SS p/p Incongruity E(YN) 
73.0=Sα  
1.86 0.1444 0.7373 0.7347 0.7424 1.0046 0.0210 0.5519 
1.93 0.0984 0.7712 0.7246 0.7751 1.0874 0.3622 0.5426 
2.00 0.0499 0.8006 0.7088 0.8034 1.1799 0.6887 0.5348 
2.06 0.0061 0.8229 0.6909 0.8248 1.2683 0.9627 0.5292 
2.13 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
2.19 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
75.0=Sα  
1.86 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1.93 0.1486 0.7706 0.7660 0.7750 1.0083 0.0359 0.5426 
2.00 0.1000 0.8000 0.7500 0.8033 1.0942 0.3749 0.5349 
2.06 0.0563 0.8223 0.7322 0.8247 1.1762 0.6580 0.5292 
2.13 0.0025 0.8455 0.7067 0.8469 1.2839 0.9853 0.5236 
2.19 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
77.0=Sα  
1.86 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
1.93 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
2.00 0.1544 0.7993 0.7948 0.8032 1.0082 0.0340 0.5349 
2.06 0.1106 0.8216 0.7769 0.8246 1.0839 0.3268 0.5292 
2.13 0.0568 0.8448 0.7514 0.8468 1.1832 0.6637 0.5236 
2.19 0.0081 0.8627 0.7257 0.8638 1.2797 0.9529 0.5196 
         n.s.: no solution 
 
 
Table A.10. 
 
S0 SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r SS p/p Incongruity E(YN) 
73.0=Sα  
0 0.0905 0.7958 0.7386 0.7951 1.1085 0.4314 0.5643 
5 0.0597 0.8065 0.7218 0.8065 1.1647 0.6299 0.5500 
8 0.0404 0.8129 0.7111 0.8135 1.2012 0.7515 0.5402 
13 0.0068 0.8236 0.6920 0.8246 1.2673 0.9587 0.5250 
16 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
19 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
75.0=Sα  
0 0.1122 0.7957 0.7566 0.7952 1.0729 0.2950 0.5712 
5 0.0812 0.8064 0.7397 0.8066 1.1276 0.4965 0.5569 
8 0.0618 0.8128 0.7288 0.8137 1.1631 0.6198 0.5470 
13 0.0281 0.8235 0.7097 0.8248 1.2274 0.8294 0.5318 
16 0.0069 0.8299 0.6973 0.8317 1.2695 0.9584 0.5214 
19 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
77.0=Sα  
0 0.1336 0.7956 0.7743 0.7953 1.0391 0.1604 0.5781 
5 0.1025 0.8063 0.7573 0.8067 1.0922 0.3644 0.5637 
8 0.0830 0.8127 0.7464 0.8138 1.1267 0.4894 0.5538 
13 0.0697 0.8170 0.7389 0.8188 1.1509 0.5734 0.5463 
16 0.0278 0.8298 0.7147 0.8318 1.2302 0.8325 0.5281 
19 0.0058 0.8363 0.7018 0.8387 1.2741 0.9653 0.5174 
         n.s.: no solution 
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PARADOX OF TAX EVASION 
 
Table 1a 
 
YD=0.8; SD=0.16 
 pY pS pY ∪  pS 
Classical analysis 0.3252 0.4998 0.6625 
    
Interrelated Evasion 
 pY pS pY ∪  pS 
Perfect collaboration n.a. n.a. 0.3212 
    
Imperfect collaboration    
Symmetric Collaboration 
αY=αS=0 0.3219 0.6781 1 
αY=αS=0.25 0.2596 0.4664 0.7260 
αY=αS=0.5 0.2163 0.3261 0.5424 
αY=αS=0.75 0.1848 0.2296 0.4144 
αY=αS=0.9 0.1696 0.1855 0.3551 
Asymmetric Collaboration 
αY=1; αS<1 0.3212 0 0.3212 
αS=1; αY<1 0 0.3212 0.3212 
         n.a.: not available 
 
Table 2a 
 
YD=1; SD=0.2 
 pY pS pY ∪  pS 
Classical analysis 0.5 0.5 0.75 
    
Interrelated Evasion 
 pY pS pY ∪  pS 
Perfect collaboration n.a. n.a. 0.5 
    
Imperfect collaboration    
Symmetric Collaboration 
αY=αS=0 0.5 0.5 1 
αY=αS=0.25 0.4 0.4 0.8 
αY=αS=0.5 0.3331 0.3331 0.6662 
αY=αS=0.75 0.2857 0.2857 0.5714 
αY=αS=0.9 0.2632 0.2632 0.5264 
Asymmetric Collaboration 
αY=1; αS<1 0.5 0 0.5 
αS=1; αY<1 0 0.5 0.5 
         n.a.: not available 
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PARADOX OF TAX EVASION  
(Replica of Bernasconi’s analysis: F=4; tR=0.3; tP=0.002) 
 
 
Table 1b 
 
YD=0.8; SD=0.16 
 pY pS pY ∪  pS 
Classical analysis 0.1441 0.2499 0.3580 
    
Interrelated Evasion 
 pY pS pY ∪  pS 
Perfect collaboration n.a. n.a. 0.1434 
    
Imperfect collaboration    
Symmetric Collaboration 
αY=αS=0 0.1435 0.2853 0.4288 
αY=αS=0.25 0.1152 0.1973 0.3125 
αY=αS=0.5 0.0960 0.1398 0.2358 
αY=αS=0.75 0.0821 0.1001 0.1822 
αY=αS=0.9 0.0755 0.0820 0.1575 
Asymmetric Collaboration 
αY=1; αS<1 0.1434 0 0.1434 
αS=1; αY<1 0 0.1434 0.1434 
         n.a.: not available 
 
 
Table 2b 
 
YD=1; SD=0.2 
 pY pS pY ∪  pS 
Classical analysis 0.2500 0.2500 0.4375 
    
Interrelated Evasion 
 pY pS pY ∪  pS 
Perfect collaboration n.a. n.a. 0.25 
    
Imperfect collaboration    
Symmetric Collaboration 
αY=αS=0 0.2500 0.2500 0.5000 
αY=αS=0.25 0.2000 0.2000 0.4000 
αY=αS=0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0.3334 
αY=αS=0.75 0.1429 0.1429 0.2858 
αY=αS=0.9 0.1316 0.1316 0.2632 
Asymmetric Collaboration 
αY=1; αS<1 0.2500 0 0.2500 
αS=1; αY<1 0 0.2500 0.2500 
         n.a.: not available 
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(IN)CONGRUITY 
 
Table 3 
(Benchmark: pY= 0.1848;  pS=0.2296) 
 
DD S)(Y >− β1  
YD=0.8; SD=0.14; αY=0.75; αS=0.75 
 pY pS pSF pY/pSF 
h=0.5 0.3118 0.0159 0.0160 19.422 
h=1.5 0.3181 0.0054 0.0056 56.604 
h=10 0.3209 0.0007 0.0008 372.824 
YD=0.8; SD=0.12; αY=0.75; αS=0.75 
 pY pS pSF pY/pSF 
h=0.5 0.3117 0.0157 0.0160 19.426 
h=1.5 0.3179 0.0053 0.0056 56.668 
h=10 0.3208 0.0006 0.0009 373.249 
YD=0.8; SD=0.10; αY=0.75; αS=0.75 
 pY pS pSF pY/pSF 
h=0.5 0.3116 0.0155 0.0160 19.448 
h=1.5 0.3178 0.0051 0.0056 56.732 
h=10 0.3207 0.0005 0.0009 373.730 
DD S)(Y <− β1  
YD=0.7; SD=0.16; αY=0.75; αS=0.75 
 pY pYF pS pS/pYF 
h=0.5 0.0091 0.0092 0.4590 49.842 
h=1.5 0.0031 0.0032 0.4708 146.661 
h=10 0.0004 0.0005 0.4762 968.198 
YD=0.6; SD=0.16; αY=0.75; αS=0.75 
 pY pYF pS pS/pYF 
h=0.5 0.0062 0.0063 0.4008 63.613 
h=1.5 0.0021 0.0022 0.4107 187.425 
h=10 0.0002 0.0003 0.4152 1239.826 
YD=0.5; SD=0.16; αY=0.75; αS=0.75 
 pY pYF pS pS/pYF 
h=0.5 0.0043 0.0044 0.3442 78.031 
h=1.5 0.0014 0.0015 0.3530 229.826 
h=10 0.0001 0.0002 0.3571 1520.698 
pYF and pSF were calculated using expressions [40'] and [40], respectively. 
 
 
Table 4 
(Benchmark: αY=0.75;αS =0.75) 
 
DD S)(Y >− β1  
 YD=0.8; SD=0.14; pY= 0.1848; pS=0.2296 YD=0.8; SD=0.12; pY= 0.1848; pS=0.2296 
 αY=0.75 αY=0.25 αY=0.75 αY=0.25 
 αS αS αS αS 
h=0.5 0.7549 0.7555 0.7500 0.7508 
h=1.5 0.7657 0.7663 0.7520 0.7527 
h=10 0.8919 0.8925 0.8098 0.8105 
DD S)(Y <− β1  
 YD=0.7; SD=0.16; pY= 0.1848; pS=0.2296 YD=0.6; SD=0.16; pY= 0.1848; pS=0.2296 
 αS=0.75 αS=0.25 αS=0.75 αS=0.25 
 αY αY αY αY 
h=0.5 >1 >1 >1 >1 
h=1.5 >1 >1 >1 >1 
h=10 >1 >1 >1 >1 
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COMPARATIVE STATICS 
 
Table 5 
(perfect collaboration) 
 
 YD SD SD+YD (SD+YD)r E(YN) 
tR 
0.1675 0.0010 0.0002 0.0010 0.0570 0.8820 
0.3000 0.5310 0.1062 0.5309 0.5460 0.8415 
0.5000 0.8000 0.1600 0.8000 0.8039 0.5757 
0.6000 0.8674 0.1735 0.8673 0.8695 0.4169 
0.7000 0.9155 0.1831 0.9155 0.9167 0.2508 
0.9890 1.0000 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000 -0.2505 
tP 
0.0001 0.7952 0.1590 0.7952 0.7953 0.5875 
0.0050 0.8000 0.1600 0.8000 0.8039 0.5757 
0.0100 0.8049 0.1610 0.8049 0.8124 0.5637 
0.0500 0.8433 0.1687 0.8433 0.8690 0.4673 
0.1500 0.9343 0.1869 0.9343 0.9580 0.2245 
0.2273 1.0000 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0350 
p 
0.0010 0.0651 0.0130 0.0652 0.0834 0.9564 
0.0100 0.1650 0.0330 0.1650 0.1813 0.8993 
0.0400 0.3091 0.0618 0.3092 0.3227 0.8099 
0.0700 0.3988 0.0798 0.3988 0.4105 0.7536 
0.1300 0.5277 0.1055 0.5277 0.5369 0.6777 
0.5000 1.0000 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5880 
F 
1.310 0.0217 0.0043 0.0218 0.0409 0.7767 
1.500 0.4333 0.0867 0.4333 0.4444 0.6986 
2.000 0.8000 0.1600 0.8000 0.8039 0.5757 
2.250 0.8763 0.1753 0.8763 0.8787 0.5267 
2.500 0.9273 0.1855 0.9273 0.9287 0.4805 
3.113 1.0000 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3734 
σ 
0.001 0.0240 0.0048 0.0239 0.0278 0.6654 
0.751 0.5504 0.1101 0.5503 0.8642 0.6046 
1.800 0.8000 0.1600 0.8000 0.9614 0.5757 
3.000 0.8789 0.1758 0.8789 0.9812 0.5666 
4.500 0.9190 0.1838 0.9190 0.9891 0.5620 
12.000 0.9696 0.1939 0.9696 0.9967 0.5561 
S0 
0 0.7959 0.1592 0.7959 0.7959 0.5862 
5 0.8061 0.1612 0.8062 0.8153 0.5600 
10 0.8164 0.1633 0.8163 0.8330 0.5338 
20 0.8368 0.1674 0.8368 0.8640 0.4815 
60 0.9186 0.1837 0.9186 0.9491 0.2720 
99.8 1.0000 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0636 
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